


CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCE
AND
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Robert B. McConnell

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCE
AND
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

by

Robert B. McConnell

June 1978

Thesis Advisor:

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and
Soviet Foreign Policy

by

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Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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The Soviet Union has, historically, always maintained a large standing army, primarily for defensive purposes. However, after World War II and with the advent of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Armed Forces have undergone tremendous change. This paper traces the changes in Soviet attitudes towards conventional military force since World War II and attempts to illustrate the role of conventional force in Soviet foreign policy. Postwar Soviet military development is traced through four distinct phases: 1945-1953 was a period in which the Soviet military was generally a continental land army; 1954-1959 saw the introduction of nuclear weapons but little or no change in strategy and doctrine; the period 1960-1967 saw the birth of the Strategic Rocket Forces and primary emphasis on nuclear warfare; and since 1968 the Soviets have been developing both a strong nuclear capability as well as a modern conventional force capable of global deployment. In addition to historical surveys of the phases in military development, detailed analyses are presented of the Soviet military interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) as well as Soviet military support of the MPLA in Angola (1974-1975).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION-----	6
II.	PHASE ONE - 1945-1953-----	14
	A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES-----	14
	B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY-----	19
III.	PHASE TWO - 1953-1960-----	26
	A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES-----	26
	B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY-----	35
IV.	PHASE THREE - 1960-1967-----	46
	A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES-----	46
	B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY-----	55
V.	PHASE FOUR - 1967-1977-----	66
	A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES-----	66
	B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY-----	75
VI.	MILITARY INTERVENTION-----	86
	A. HUNGARY- 1956-----	86
	B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 1968-----	105
	C. ANGOLA - 1975-1976-----	124
VII.	CONCLUSION-----	139
	APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS-----	146
	APPENDIX B: GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF PHASES IN POSTWAR SOVIET HISTORY-----	148
	BIBLIOGRAPHY-----	151
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST-----	157

I. INTRODUCTION

The explosion of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima heralded the development of an entirely new arsenal of weapons and military strategy for future wars. The two superpowers that emerged from World War II - the United States and the USSR - were to become involved in an ideological struggle shadowed by a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. Terms such as "mutual assured destruction," "MIRV," "SLBM," "throw weight," "ABM," "SALT," and many others related to nuclear weaponry have become commonplace in American newspapers and magazines. For years the U.S. and USSR have discussed ways of limiting nuclear weapons in order that neither side gain an advantage over the other. In short, negotiations have been carried out in an effort to maintain a balance such that each nation is a nuclear hostage of the other. Therefore, for several years there was a trend away from discussions of the conventional or non-nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. The withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam gave the American people a chance to "look around" at other world events and many became concerned with the quality of Soviet conventional weaponry used by the Arab nations during the Arab-Israeli War in October of 1973, as well as the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975.

In the past year there has been a general acknowledgement in the U.S. of continued substantial improvements of non-nuclear forces by the Soviets. Not only have these improvements

increased the Soviet threat to NATO but also have provided the Kremlin leadership with an expanding global capability that did not exist a few years ago. In the Annual Defense Department Report presented to Congress in January of 1977, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld voiced his concern over the Soviet build-up of conventional forces.

These modern offensive forces, combined with their increasing capability to project power thousands of miles from Soviet shores, have not appeared overnight. They are the result of a steady effort made with great momentum over considerable time. What is new is Western recognition of their magnitude and extent.¹

Why is the deployment of a strong conventional force by the Soviet Union so significant? Soviet leaders obviously realize the risks and consequences of a nuclear conflict with the West and try to avoid such a holocaust. However, since the end of World War II the Soviet Union has employed its conventional forces in several different ways while avoiding a direct confrontation with the West. To name only a few: Soviet units carried out the blockade of Berlin in 1948; Soviet troops intervened in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968; the Soviets provided arms and military assistance to Mideast and African nations during the 1960's and 1970's, and, more recently, they supported a Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola. An analysis of the Soviets' use of conventional forces would show that all have had a political dimension or overtone. In 1954, a

¹Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978, Executive Summary, p. 23, January 17, 1977.

Soviet officer writing for the Soviet General Staff organ wrote, "The objective of military strategy is the creation by military means of those conditions under which politics is in a position to achieve the aims it sets for itself."² Western experts have indicated that they are also aware of the importance of conventional force as a means of achieving political goals. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told Congress:

Conventional military force remains a principal instrument for pursuing international objectives where military power is to be used at all....the primary burden of deterrence now falls increasingly on conventional forces, although their effectiveness is enhanced by the nuclear capabilities that underlie them....Conventional wars appear relatively controllable, since their tempo tends to be slower, allowing policy makers to act without excessive pressure.³

Professor John Erickson states it in a more succinct manner.

The attainment by the Soviet Union of nuclear parity.... puts a premium on operations below the nuclear level, for here is usable military power....the conduct of operations below the nuclear level has emphasized the need to improve tactical performance, as well as preparation for limited war, that is, both responding to and initiating military operations at select levels.⁴

Acknowledging the importance of conventional military forces, the military analyst would like to be able to predict or foresee the events which would induce the Soviet leaders to employ such forces. However, there are several variables which must be considered in an attempt to understand such a decision.

²Raymond Garthoff, "Military Power in Soviet Policy," in The Military and Technical Revolution, Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy, ed., John Erickson (Institute for the Study of the USSR, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 241, quoting Colonel S. Kozlov, "Some Questions on Theory of Strategy," Vozzenaya mys, No. 11, 1954, p. 23.

³Rumsfeld, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978, p. 22.

⁴John Erickson, "Trends in the Soviet Combined-Arms Concept," Strategic Review, Winter 1977, Vol. 5, pp. 39-40.

Soviet military doctrine and strategy - though tied to the ideology and doctrine of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union - does reflect the leaders' perception of change, both internally and externally.⁵ Many objective factors which affect Soviet military doctrine must be considered if one is analyzing Soviet decision-making. Kremlin leadership is most certainly always aware of the degree of tension between East and West. In other words, they are aware of the possibility of a nuclear confrontation with the West. This is tied closely to the ever present problem of "strategic balance" and the degree of "imbalance" the Soviets might perceive. Related to the strategic balance are the types of weapons available to the Soviet Union in the event of a general - and obviously nuclear - war and will have an impact on the Soviet decision to employ conventional forces for political purposes. Associated closely with all of the factors stated above is the role of military-technological innovation. The state of the art in weapons technology impacts heavily on Soviet military doctrine and the nation's ability to involve itself in new military endeavors.⁶ However, it must be remembered that development, production and deployment of a weapons system is a lengthy process, requiring a lead time of six to ten years from

⁵See Appendix A for Soviet definitions of military "doctrine" and "strategy."

⁶Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine," Comparative Defense Policy, ed. Frank B. Horton III, Anthony C. Rogerson and Edward L. Warner III (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), pp. 202-207.

initiation to deployment to operational units.⁷ Thus, a Soviet leader may support development of a new weapon system that might not become a reality until his successor has come to power.

In addition to the objective variants listed above, there are some equally important subjective variants that must be considered. One of the most obvious is the ideology and historical tradition of the Soviet Union. Writers have written an unending stream of books trying to explain the Soviet way of carrying on government affairs - the Soviet "standard operating procedure." This involves an understanding of Soviet bureaucratic politics. Analysts of the Soviet system have come to realize the importance of interest groups in Soviet politics.⁸ Finally, one must consider the variant of conscious leadership preference. The leaders of the Soviet Union have all had definite individual styles of leadership. It is in this area that one can only hope that decisions made by the Soviet leaders are those of a "rational man" as it is virtually impossible to make plans or take action in anticipation of irrational decisions. This is particularly true when the leadership of another nation is trying to anticipate the Soviet leadership's decision to employ military force.

The purpose of this paper is to review the Soviet attitudes toward conventional military force since World War II with an

⁷William F. Scott, Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1975), p. 1.

⁸For a detailed study of interest groups, see Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, edited by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). See especially Chapter V, "The Military" by Roman Kolkowicz.

attempt to analyze the capabilities of the conventional forces and their role in supporting Soviet foreign policy. The research presents a historical survey of phases in Soviet affairs since 1945 characterized by a different foreign policy approach and/or by a significantly different Soviet strategic position relative to the United States. Significant changes in Soviet military doctrine and strategy will be highlighted. Generally speaking, the phases will closely relate to changes in Soviet leadership since 1945. However, the objective and subjective variants discussed earlier have brought about additional phases that do not correlate exactly with the appearance or demise of principal Soviet leaders. Not all writers and historians agree exactly on the start and ending points for these phases. Zbigniew Brzezinski divided the period into six phases⁹ while Roman Kolkowicz outlined four phases in his 1971 work.¹⁰ For the purpose of this paper, the period surveyed will be divided into four phases that resemble the development of the Soviet Armed Forces as presented by General-Major M. I, Cherednichenko of the Soviet Army.

General Cherednichenko divided the development of the post-war military in the following way: (1) 1945-1953; (2) 1953-1960 (the first stage of the nuclear period); and (3) a phase beginning

⁹Zbigniew Brzezinski, "How the Cold War was Played," Foreign Affairs 51, October 1972.

¹⁰Roman Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives," World Politics 23, April 1971.

in 1960 (the second stage of the nuclear period).¹¹ According to Cherednichenko, "Substantial changes in military art have taken place at definite periods, on the average of every 6-8 years."¹² For the purpose of this paper, the third phase will end in 1967 and a fourth phase covering the period 1967 to 1977 will be discussed. This will be considered the period when "flexible response" is added to Soviet military doctrine.¹³

Each of the four phases will be reviewed in a very general sense. The Soviet foreign and domestic policy goals and objectives applicable to each phase will be presented. In addition, the Soviet military capabilities applicable to each phase will be presented, with emphasis on conventional forces. In this way, it should be possible to relate changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies with changes in Soviet military doctrine and the accompanying changes in emphasis on specific weaponry. It is these two factors - goals/objectives and military capabilities - which must be weighed against the anticipated response or reaction by both a "target country" and the Western powers, basically the U.S., to allow analysis of the Soviet decision to employ or not employ conventional military force. To provide specific illustration of the applicability of these factors,

¹¹M. I. Cherednichenko, "On Features in the Development of Military Art in the Postwar Period," Military Historical Journal, No. 6, Moscow, June 1970, pp. 19-30, quoted in Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970-1975: A Soviet View, translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 109-123.

¹²Ibid., p. 123.

¹³For a graphical presentation of the phases described by Brzezinski, Kolkowicz and Cherednichenko, see Appendix B.

an analysis of three incidents involving the actual employment of Soviet conventional military forces in one form or another will be presented. These incidents will be the Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Soviet support of war by proxy in Angola from 1975-1976.

II. PHASE ONE - 1945-1953

The first phase in postwar Soviet affairs to be surveyed coincides with the final years of Stalin's leadership in the Kremlin. The end of World War II - or the Great Patriotic War as it is called in the Soviet Union - signalled the beginning of a new era in Soviet history. The USSR emerged as one of the Great Powers as well as leader of a greatly expanded Socialist world. Weakened and ravaged by the war with Germany and faced with the task of consolidating their gains in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leaders saw their ideology and political system threatened by the one nation that had displayed the capability for atomic warfare - the United States. Stalin's strong, tyrannical control over all affairs of the Soviet Union, to include military planning, was later to be the key to understanding what actually took place with respect to military doctrine and strategy during the immediate postwar period.

A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES

As World War II came to a close, the Soviet Union was faced with a period of reconstruction and concentration upon industrial and military growth. Stalin could not overlook the fact that not only did the U.S. have a head start in the advanced technology of the nuclear age but also the U.S. was deeply involved in the affairs of Europe. Stalin was faced with two major problems: (1) the USSR had to keep the U.S. from exploiting

unrest in Eastern Europe or reacting in a dangerous manner to Stalin's political moves that were calculated to take advantage of disagreement among the Western powers; and (2) he had to set the course for the USSR during a period of vulnerability that existed while the Soviets struggled to overcome the nuclear advantage of the West.¹⁴

Many of Stalin's troubles were the result of the two conflicting views of world order that existed throughout Europe. Most of the European nations, recovering from the second major war in less than fifty years, shared a "universalist view." The universalists believed that all nations shared a common interest in the affairs of the world and they assumed national security could be guaranteed by all nations working together. However, the Soviet Union supported a "sphere of influence view" by which each great power would be predominant in its area of special interest. In this view, the Soviets assumed that national security would be guaranteed by the existing balance of power. The sphere of influence view allowed the Russians to protect their frontiers jealously - especially their border to the west. While it was this view that fueled the Cold War, it did allow the Russians to consolidate gains in East Europe as well as shore up holes in their domestic affairs.¹⁵

¹⁴Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 13.

¹⁵Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Erik P. Hoffman and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. (New York: Adeline-Atherton, Inc., 1971), pp. 232-235.

Domestically, Stalin had to gain control of the Russian people and once again surround them with the "protective blanket" of communism. Ideology had proved insufficient in rallying the people of the USSR during the war and Stalin was forced to rely on the spirit of nationalism and "defense of the fatherland" as well as help from the Church to rally the population of the Soviet Union. With the war over, the "frivolous behavior" of the war years had to be erased. Stalin had to reclaim the masses of people that had been removed from Soviet control and Soviet soil and then reindoctrinate them. By the summer of 1946, a full scale ideological campaign was opened against those Soviet citizens that had been exposed to the West and expressed admiration for Western culture and society. Stalin needed "true believers" of the communist ideology if he was to carry out the economic recovery of the USSR.¹⁶

Economically, the USSR had suffered war losses almost beyond description. Stalin instituted the Fourth Five-Year Plan to run from 1946 to 1950. The Plan's goal was not only to provide economic recovery but also to raise output higher than that of 1940. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-1955) projected a continuous, substantial rise in production. Allocating its resources as only a totalitarian state can, the USSR achieved a level of production that approached that of

¹⁶Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 3d ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1972), pp. 440-443.

Western Europe. While heavy industry grew, light industry and the output of consumers' goods lagged drastically. Stalin was intent on accomplishing his economic goals without regard for the needs of the people. His domestic goals had to be met to allow him to carry out his goals in East Europe.¹⁷

East Europe provided Stalin the opportunity to establish a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. It was extremely important to him that the Soviet Union gain and maintain control of the East European nations. With the exception of Yugoslavia and Albania, the Red Army occupied all of East Europe. It is obvious now that Stalin was not "saving" those nations from Hitler's armies to enable them to reappear after the war as democratic, independent states. As Stalin once told Tito, "This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."¹⁸

At the Yalta Conference in 1945, Stalin indicated that the future security of the USSR depended upon the establishment of governments in East Europe friendly to the Soviets. It was this point that was to create such disagreement between Stalin and the Western leaders in later years as it was not possible to have a government that was friendly to the USSR and still satisfy the Western Powers' definition of a democracy. In effect, Stalin was attempting to legally establish the Soviet

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 449.

¹⁸ Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), p. 114.

zone of influence.¹⁹ Stalin's goal was the Sovietization of East Europe - the establishment of Communist-controlled governments.

The Sovietization of East Europe included a complete break with the West. The rejection of the Marshall Plan for both the USSR and the governments of East Europe in June of 1948 marked the irreversible turning point in the affairs of those governments. But, Stalin did not stop there as he began a militant campaign against Western Europe which included attacks on the Marshall Plan. The campaign also included: attempts by the French and Italian Communist Parties to topple their governments using tactics involving strikes and mass movements; the coup in Czechoslovakia; efforts to gain control of Yugoslavia from Tito; and the carrying out of the blockade of Berlin. In January of 1949, Moscow introduced an organization in East Europe that was in some ways the Soviet answer to the Marshall Plan - the Council for Economic-Mutual Assistance (CEMA). It was to provide for pooling of resources and division of labor integrated with Soviet economic plans. Yet, Stalin was not satisfied with his efforts and was concerned with the possibility of his actions bringing about greater unity among the Western Powers. He had to let up on the pressure.

A new policy evolved in the spring of 1949 about the same time the Berlin blockade was lifted. Stalin changed his tactics

¹⁹William Hardy McNeil, American, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946 (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970), p. 533.

to try and disrupt the cohesion and common defense efforts of the West. He sided with the "Peace Movement" by verbally attacking the dangers of German remilitarization and arousing the popular feeling against nuclear warfare. Reasons for the new policy doubtlessly included a need to slow growing trends in Western unity, an opportunity to pay closer attention to the incorporation of East Europe into the Soviet sphere and the need to buy time while Soviet technology improved in order to shift the balance of power between the USSR and the West.²⁰

In summary, the Soviet goals and objectives in the postwar years involved "continental problems" such as the consolidation of gains in East Europe and the economic reconstruction of the USSR.

B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY

Historically, Russia has always had a large standing army. However, the presence of a strong military force in the Soviet Union is significant not only as a potential adversary of Western armies but also as a threat to Communist Party hegemony within the USSR. Since the October Revolution of 1917, Soviet leaders have recognized the need for powerful armed forces and yet have maneuvered affairs of state in such a way that the military never achieved a position which would put it beyond control of the Party. This was proved again immediately after WW II.

Following the war, Stalin severely limited the power and prerogatives of the military leaders. In fact, he encouraged

²⁰Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 18-26.

sweeping reassertion of control in the military by Party "apparatchiks." In February 1946, Stalin made a public statement indicating the war had been won because of the superiority of the Soviet political and social system and not through the brave efforts of Russian troops. The Party's anti-military attitude was once again demonstrated when it upgraded the political organs' authority over the military while undercutting that of the commanders. Furthermore, Stalin encouraged the belief that he was the father of the military doctrine which had brought about the victory over Germany.²¹

Stalin's military science was typical of the deterministic rigidity and the pseudo-scientific apparatus characteristic of Marxist-Leninist teaching. Stalin believed there were certain principles that determined the outcome of the war; he called those "permanently operating factors." The factors included: (1) stability of the rear; (2) morale of the army; (3) quantity and quality of divisions; (4) the armament of the army; and (5) the organizing ability of the command personnel. (Stalin believed the factor of strategic surprise was of only secondary importance.) He insisted the Soviet officer corps rely solely on those factors in determining military theory. Additionally, he insisted that the military leaders base all future activities on the lessons learned from the Great Patriotic War. The result was a contradiction between the technological revolution and

²¹Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 240.

and the persistent conservatism in Soviet military thinking.²² Stalin was glorifying the past while struggling to face the immediate problem of trying to restrain a nuclear-armed opponent - the United States.

When the war ended, the Soviet Union is said to have had almost 12,000,000 men in uniform. Although that number was reduced drastically in the next few years (to a level of between 2,800,000 and 4,000,000 men in 1948), the Soviet leaders left a large combined-arms force of ground troops and tactical aircraft in East Europe. That force created the impression the Soviets were capable and prepared to advance rapidly to the English Channel. In essence, the threat of a Soviet land-power was the counterbalance to U.S. nuclear power.²³ In essence, it appeared Western Europe was held hostage by Stalin. Stalin was determined to appear strong in spite of weaknesses in the Soviet armed forces.

The first major reorganization of Soviet military forces after the initial postwar demobilization occurred in 1948. While some organizational changes occurred, military units generally retained WW II equipment. It was not until about 1950 that postwar equipment was introduced into the military and changes in training applicable to the more modern equipment began. Battlefield mobility and firepower for field armies were increased with the addition of motorized transport and

²²Ibid., p. 118.

²³Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 33-34.

improvements in armored equipment. Priority was given to Soviet forces deployed against West Europe as those forces were among the very best in the Soviet military.²⁴

Reorganization of the Air Force took the form of a consolidation resulting in the reduction in total number of aircraft from 20,000 in 1945 to 15,000 in 1946. Unlike the U.S. which had developed and expanded the role of strategic bombing, the Soviet Air Force was more tactically oriented. The majority of the immediate postwar force was for support of ground armies.²⁵ However, Stalin realized the impact of the Allied strategic bombing of Germany and placed great emphasis on the development of a long-range bomber force and a defensive jet fighter force.

The most significant jet fighter developed was unveiled in December of 1946. The MIG-15, using the latest British jet engine technology, entered mass production with the total output eventually reaching 15,000 aircraft. By the end of the Korean War the MIG-17 was being mass produced and, with the MIG-15, became the mainstays of both tactical aviation and the air defense interceptor force.²⁶

The Soviet air defense forces initially were composed of WW II type fighters and large numbers of anti-aircraft artillery. However, it was not capable of defending against targets penetrating at high altitude or during inclement weather. The PVO

²⁴Ibid., pp. 40-41.

²⁵Robert A. Kilmarx, A History of Soviet Air Power (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), p. 226.

²⁶Ibid., p. 230.

interceptor force increased in size from about 1,000 aircraft in 1948 to more than 2,000 aircraft in 1953 by which time it had been converted to an all jet force. Nevertheless, throughout the entire Stalinist period, the air defense system suffered from serious deficiencies which included: lack of all-weather interceptors, inadequate ground control intercept radars, and a force unable to provide air defense for the entire immense Soviet land mass.²⁷ Soviet aircraft design bureaus began work on developing more advanced fighter aircraft but they did not become a reality until after Stalin's death in 1953.

Like the air defense forces, the postwar Soviet Navy suffered from many deficiencies. The strength of the Navy was at an all-time low and Stalin therefore gave his support to a long-range program to develop a balanced naval fleet. The first efforts involved ships of prewar design for defense of the coastal waters of the Soviet Union. By 1950, Stalin supported a ten-year naval plan calling for construction of large surface fleets and large numbers of medium range submarines.²⁸ While the primary mission of the Navy was to defend the Soviet state, Soviet military successes of WW II had expanded the territory of the Soviet Union and provided greater naval access to adjacent areas. Postwar geography seemed to support Stalin's 1930 decision to construct major warships. However, Stalin had visions of a conventional navy and did not make plans for the integration of nuclear weapons.

²⁷ Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 48-49.

²⁸ The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Soviet Sea Power (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 1969), pp. 36-41.

Stalin, nevertheless, was interested in nuclear weapons and delivery systems for those weapons. The Soviets exploded their first atomic device in August 1949. When nuclear weapons were initially introduced into operational Soviet forces early in the fifties, the primary delivery systems were the TU-4 piston medium bomber and later the IL-28 jet bomber. These aircraft were capable of attacking Europe and the periphery of the Eurasian landmass but were not capable of flying intercontinental missions. The initial emphasis on striking European targets carried over into the development of early ballistic missiles although they were not operationally deployed until after Stalin's time. Stalin is given credit for initiating programs of research and development that ultimately brought about intercontinental bomber and missile delivery systems during the period of Khrushchev's leadership.²⁹

Roman Kolkowicz characterized Soviet military policy during Stalin's postwar years as having

....a basic reliance on massive conventional forces deployed in an active defense posture with a narrow, continental mission....Although modern military weapons were being introduced into the Soviet military establishment, Stalin continued to force his strategists to "look back" to the successful Russo-German war....Stalin, who had initiated a massive crash program for the development of atomic weapons soon after the war, did not consider the radical implications of such weapons for the nature of future war....³⁰

²⁹Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 36-41.

³⁰Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond," p. 431.

Raymond Gartoff provides an excellent summary of Soviet military doctrine during the period in question.

....In 1946, the Workers' and Peasants' Army was renamed the "Soviet Army," a change reflecting the long-maturing and significant evolution of that body from the early revolutionary army of the civil war to a national army and arm of the state. This change was one of many that cumulatively marked a shift of political structure. As in other sectors of Soviet society, the postwar tasks of the armed forces were concentrated on the build-up of the power of the Soviet state, and of the Communist Bloc, for the long run....Efforts were concentrated on modernizing the armed forces as a whole, on providing a token long-range air force armed with nuclear weapons, and on developing advanced weapons systems for the future. Military doctrine continued virtually unchanged, and in 1953 was simply an elaboration and canonization of Soviet military doctrine of 1945. But the slowly developing military thinking was not incongruous with the virtually unchanged and single-minded role of the instrument in Soviet policy: for defense in the unlikely case that an enemy should attack, and to garrison and maintain the new Soviet empire. The only overt use of military power had been the rather conservative one of remaining where they had advanced to during the war, while political means were employed in most, though not all, situations to acquire this occupied territory. Nonetheless, the Soviet armed forces were developing into an instrument with other potentialities, which would later be recognized as Soviet political strategy reawakened.³¹

³¹Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 23.

III. PHASE TWO: 1953-1960

The second postwar phase to be surveyed is highlighted by the problems of succession following Stalin's death in 1953. Politically, almost the entire period was affected by Khrushchev's struggle for power and his eventual attainment of leadership in both Party and state. Bureaucratic infighting over personal issues and resource allocation affected not only foreign policy matters but also Soviet military affairs. However, the world saw a drastic change in the Soviet participation in world affairs during this period. While Stalin is credited with making the USSR a world power, Khrushchev shook loose the restraints of continental concerns and pursued a diplomacy which was to transform the nation into a global power.

A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES

Following Stalin's death, the Soviet Presidium appeared to favor a collective leadership. However, the real power was in the hands of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov. Malenkov, designated by Stalin as his heir, immediately assumed the positions of Prime Minister and Party Secretary. Fearing Malenkov's power, the other collective leaders forced him to relinquish one of his positions. Malenkov chose the Prime Ministership and Khrushchev was selected as Party Secretary. Beria became the head of a newly consolidated secret police which saw the merging of the MGB and MVD. Molotov retained his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

What appeared to be a smooth transition of power was short-lived as Beria was purged within four months. Fear of the power he controlled with his secret police drove the other Soviet leaders to eliminate him in an attempt to guarantee some stability. With the element of physical violence - the secret police - removed, the struggle for leadership took a political form.

The dispute that arose between Khrushchev and Malenkov was to affect not only domestic affairs but also the formulation of foreign policy. Khrushchev, in late 1953, concentrated on an issue that was to increase his support. The issue was agriculture or, more importantly, the need for greater efforts in the "agricultural front." In early 1954, he instituted his "virgin lands" program in which millions of acres of land in Soviet Asia were plowed up and sown. Through his efforts in agricultural policy, Khrushchev realized an increase in his power.³² He was then ready to expand his "interests" and "pressures."

In August 1953, Malenkov announced his support for the development of light industry and consumer goods at the expense of traditional heavy industry. The development of light industry was to have brought about a faster rise in the standard of living for the Soviet people. However, Malenkov ran into direct opposition from Khrushchev. Khrushchev refused to endorse the Malenkov plan and instead supported the role of heavy industry

³²Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, p. 460.

in equipping agriculture which he believed was the most important task in the economic life of the USSR. Additionally, he stressed the importance of heavy industry for the maintenance of a strong military defense.

Defense policy was to be the other major disagreement between Khrushchev and Malenkov. In March 1954, Malenkov made a unilateral statement that nuclear war would result in "the destruction of world civilization." He was determined to bolster light industry and therefore stressed that external risks had to be avoided in order that East-West tensions would not require increases in military expenditures. Khrushchev maintained that nuclear war would destroy capitalism but not socialism. Khrushchev and his supporters "let out the stops" in depicting the U.S. as an antagonist which could only be restrained by a Soviet military build-up. This meant, of course, support of heavy industry.³³

On 8 February 1955, Malenkov resigned as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In his statement he spoke of his "inexperience," assumed the "guilt" for what he called "the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture" and admitted that the policy of basing the economy on heavy industry was the "only correct" one. On Khrushchev's recommendation, Bulganin replaced Malenkov as Prime Minister. Khrushchev was gaining domestically in power and prestige and saw the need to improve his image in Eastern Europe.

³³Sidney I. Ploss, "Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy" in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Erik P. Hoffman & Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. (New York: Adeline-Atherton, Inc., 1971), pp. 82-83.

Eastern Europe had not gone unaffected by the death of Stalin. The post-Stalin changes in the USSR had created the impression of indecision and weakness. In June 1953, unrest broke out in two of the Soviet satellites. Strikes in Czechoslovakia were put down by the secret police while Soviet troops were used to crush general strikes in East Berlin. The Soviets moved to liberalize affairs in Hungary later that summer to avoid unrest in that country. Restlessness in Eastern Europe required the individual attention of Khrushchev and Bulganin in 1955.

In May 1955, the Soviet leaders increased their control over the affairs of Eastern Europe by signing the Warsaw Treaty which placed the individual national military forces under Soviet command. A short time later Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Yugoslavia in an attempt to improve Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The two governments signed a declaration stating that "differences in the concrete forms of socialist development are exclusively the concern of the peoples of the respective countries."³⁴ The visit dramatized the importance the Soviets placed on the idea of ideological unity in the Socialist Bloc. Temporarily satisfied in Eastern Europe, the Soviets turned to international affairs.

1955 Was the year Khrushchev began to work towards making the USSR a global power. In May, the Austrian Treaty was signed and Soviet troops were removed from that country. In July, a

³⁴Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, pp. 463-464.

summit meeting of the Big Four was held at Geneva. Although there were no significant results, Khrushchev benefited from the "Spirit of Geneva." In September, the Soviets returned the Porkkala base to Finland, apparently as a means of pressuring the U.S. to reduce its bases in Europe. That same month, the Soviets recognized the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, it was not all international statesmanship designed to ease world pressure. In the summer, a Soviet delegation visited Cairo and "arranged" for Nasser to purchase arms "from Czechoslovakia." Before the year ended, Khrushchev and Bulganin made a widely acclaimed tour of India, Burma and Afghanistan.³⁵ However, even with all the activity in foreign affairs, Khrushchev remained busy improving his image and increasing his power in domestic affairs.

The Twentieth Party Congress, held in February 1956, saw Khrushchev determined to further his personal goals. At a closed session of the Congress Khrushchev delivered his famous "secret speech." He attacked the reputation of Stalin in what some believe was an attempt to identify himself as the leader of a large group wanting to break with the Stalinist past. By detailing specific misdeeds of Stalin, many of Khrushchev's competitors were implicated. Khrushchev also set forth three sweeping innovations in the international relations of the communist world. First, he stated his doctrine of peaceful coexistence and non-inevitability of war. It was his attempt

³⁵Ibid., pp. 464-465.

to reduce tension with the West and lessen the threat of nuclear war. Second, he proclaimed the doctrine of separate national roads to socialism. Thirdly, he set forth the idea of non-violent communist revolutions. Each of these innovations was a radical break with Leninism. All were "prompted by pragmatic temptations of foreign policy or domestic politics" and "all were instrumental in precipitating the schism and polycentrism that subsequently sapped the strength and resolve of the communist movement."³⁶

The response to Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin was surely more than he ever anticipated. Within a few short weeks riots broke out in Tbilisi, in the Georgian Republic, and over a hundred people were killed. The greatest response, and ultimately the gravest problems for Khrushchev, took place in Eastern Europe. Stalinist leaders in Poland and Hungary came under heavy criticism and were eventually replaced. In June 1956, riots broke out in Poland resulting in the death of about one hundred people before control was regained by the police. Still, the Poles set out to establish their separate road to socialism. Khrushchev's personal diplomacy and threat of military force did not deter the Poles, and Khrushchev relented. The Hungarians were not so easily satisfied. In October 1956, demonstrations in Budapest supporting the Poles erupted into a full-fledged revolution. When the Hungarians withdrew from

³⁶Robert V. Daniels, "Doctrine and Foreign Policy" in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Erik P. Hoffman and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr. (New York: Adeline-Atherton, Inc., 1971), pp. 158-159.

the Warsaw Pact and declared themselves a neutral country, the Soviets had to intervene with a strong military force to regain control of the country and ensure Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Reaction to the Hungarian affair was worldwide. Prominent Communists in several Western countries expressed shock and rage. Domestically, Khrushchev's reputation was also tarnished.³⁷ (For a detailed analysis of the Soviet military intervention in Hungary, see Section VI.A. "Hungary - 1956.")

Khrushchev in 1957 increased his control of domestic affairs to even greater lengths. The issue of industrial reorganization became an important matter involving the Soviet leadership. Industry was organized into a cumbersome ministerial system that needed to be reorganized. The method of reorganization was to be extremely important politically. If the ministries were broken up only partially, control of industry would still remain in the hands of the economic bureaucracies. Khrushchev insisted the reorganization involve transfer of industrial direction to the provincial level. That would guarantee that Khrushchev's Party supporters at that level would assume dominant positions. Khrushchev was successful and his control of domestic affairs again increased. Ironically, in 1958, having achieved his political objectives, Khrushchev reverted from fragmented control of industries to larger economic control units.³⁸ However, his success in industrial reorganization was a major factor in an attempt to depose him in June 1957.

³⁷Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, pp. 467-470.

³⁸John A. Armstrong, "The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy" in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Erik P. Hoffman & Frederick J. Flernon, Jr. (New York: Adeline-Atherton, Inc., 1971), pp. 55-56.

The Soviet leaders in the Presidium saw their careers and personal power threatened by Khrushchev. Returning from a trip to Finland, Khrushchev was advised that a majority of the Presidium - seven of eleven members - had voted for his resignation. Khrushchev refused to resign and took his case to the Central Committee. The Central Committee, and the Soviet military, supported Khrushchev to the dismay of the Presidium majority. The end result was the "Anti-Party Group" - those in the Presidium voting against Khrushchev - were stripped of their posts and expelled from the Central Committee.³⁹

Almost overnight Khrushchev had eliminated his major political opposition and replaced them with his supporters. It was not until May 1958 that Bulganin - initially a supporter of the "Anti-Party Group" but apparently one of the Presidium members who "changed his mind" - was eased out of office as Prime Minister. He was replaced by Khrushchev who then held both positions, Prime Minister and Party Secretary.⁴⁰ Having overcome all opposition, Khrushchev was in a position to dictate his policies to the Soviet government.

During the period 1953 to 1959, Khrushchev's attempts to transform the USSR into a global power was made at the expense of weakening Soviet control in the socialist world as well as increasing the danger of confrontation with the U.S. During the Suez crisis of 1956, the Soviets threatened France and

³⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), pp. 251-252.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

England with military retaliation using nuclear armed missiles. After the ceasefire in Egypt, Moscow threatened to use "Soviet volunteers" to support the Egyptians. In October 1957, the Soviets developed the story of a Turkish military threat on Syria. The Soviets threatened that an attack on Syria would bring a response by the Soviet military. Military units carried out maneuvers in the Black Sea and Transcaucasus as a show of force. In July 1958, the Soviets again carried out maneuvers in the Transcaucasus and in Bulgaria when the U.S. landed marines in Lebanon in response to events in Iraq. However, the Soviets made only vague threats against intervention in Iraq by the West. Verbal threats were made in September 1958 as a gesture of support for the Chinese Communists in their bombardment of Quemoy. The Soviets provided the Chinese Communists no material support however. In November 1958, the Soviets demanded West Berlin become a "free city" within six months. The same demand was made again in 1959; however, the threats were obviously ineffective.

....Soviet threats have always been vague, with loopholes for withdrawal; invariably, they have been made only when Moscow was certain that the Western power or powers were not going to undertake the actions its retaliatory threats pertained to; and, in the few instances when the opponents have acted, Soviet retaliation did not follow.⁴¹

Since 1955 the Soviets have used military aid and assistance to non-communist countries as an important tool in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives. Aid was first provided the

⁴¹Gartoff, Soviet Military Policy, pp. 113-115.

countries in the Middle East and this area has maintained a priority with the Soviets. By 1959 the Soviets had exported weapons to the Far East, the Indian Sub-Continent, the Middle East, and Latin America. The Soviet Union's objectives were initially to offset Western attempts to establish any type of anti-Soviet alliance in Third World areas. In the long run, the Soviets were expanding their influence in areas of the world where they had not been active before.⁴²

In summary, the domestic and foreign accomplishments of this phase were closely related to the struggle for succession following the death of Stalin. They were ultimately designed to increase the power and prestige not only of the USSR, but also Khrushchev himself. It was a period of ambivalent goals and political opportunism and adventurism carried out under circumstances

B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY

Under Stalin's leadership the armed forces had been as apolitical as he could make them. Through the use of the Main Political Administration (MPA-O, a Party-political control organization), the secret police element in the military, and occasional purges, it had been possible to short-stop any politically minded military officers. However, the struggle to keep the military, and the power it wielded, out of politics diminished after Stalin's death. The support of the military

⁴²Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World, revised and abridged edition (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975), pp. 82-84.

became important in the succession struggle, which ultimately led to one man's supremacy in the Party.

For two years following Stalin's death, two factions struggled for control of the Party. Khrushchev, as Party Secretary, had a power base of the Central Committee and Secretariat. Malenkov, as Prime Minister, had a power base of the Party Presidium and the governmental bureaucracy. The Ministry of Defense was nominally under the control of the Council of Ministers and thus under Malenkov's authority. However, Malenkov's plan to develop light industry was not in the interests of the military. Additionally, Malenkov had expressed his views on nuclear and the need to avoid such a war. He stabilized defense spending and it appeared he opposed expansion of the armed forces. Meanwhile, Khrushchev supported heavy industry and, by stressing the antagonism of the West, supported the growth of the military. The result was as one would expect: the military supported Khrushchev. The military was in a position to play one faction against the other.

Khrushchev wanted the support of the entire military and used various schemes to achieve it. He relied heavily on his World War II association with several generals during the battle of Stalingrad. (Some historians have named the generals the "Stalingrad Group.") Associates of Khrushchev headed the sections that controlled promotions both in the Party and the Ministry of Defense and provided Khrushchev with important

⁴³ Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, pp. 243-244.

sources of influence. Khrushchev appointed several of his supporters, mostly from the "Stalingrad Group," to positions of authority in the military. At the same time he gave support to Marshal Zhukov, one of the most famous WW II military leaders. Zhukov was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense. His associates, aptly named "Zhukovites" by Western analysts, made up a second faction in the military. Nevertheless, both factions supported the removal of Malenkov.⁴⁴

After Malenkov's resignation, from February 1955 to October 1957, Khrushchev and Zhukov had an "alliance of mutual convenience." They seemingly supported one another in consolidating their individual positions. Zhukov was intent on developing a modern armed forces with the associated doctrine and training.

Even though Khrushchev continued to appoint members of the "Stalingrad Group" to positions of authority, Zhukov seemed to have the upper hand in military affairs. At the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, Zhukov was made a candidate member of the Presidium of the Party, the first professional military officer to achieve that status. Zhukov took advantage of his power and strived to reduce the amount of Party control in military matters. By 1957, Zhukov had put the professional military in a position where they had gained in influence in military affairs relative to the political administration, the Party organization and the secret police.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 243-245.

The year 1957 was to see the zenith of Zhukov's power and popularity. In June, when the "Anti-Party Group" attempted to remove Khrushchev from power, Zhukov told the Central Committee the Soviet armed forces would not "permit" anyone to "bid for power." As a full member of the Presidium by that time, he spoke on "behalf of the armed forces" and gave their support to Khrushchev as Party leader.⁴⁵

With the fall of the "Anti-Party Group," Khrushchev and Zhukov appeared to be the most powerful men in the USSR. Needless to say, Khrushchev did not intend to share that distinction with anyone. Zhukov had created a military establishment that had become too independent and was almost "non-Party." Doctrine stressed professional military competence rather than dominance of the Party. It was only a matter of time before Khrushchev had to get rid of his potential rival. In October 1957, Zhukov was quietly removed from his position as Minister of Defense and from the Presidium. When Zhukov fought the issue, he was publicly disgraced.⁴⁶

The plenum of the Central Committee, which met in October 1957, did more than remove Zhukov from his appointments. The plenum actually began what was to become a major reform of the Soviet military. The specific objectives of the reform have been described in the following way: (1) to break down barriers between ranks to inhibit elitist tendencies; (2) to establish

⁴⁵Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy, pp. 50-52.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 52-54.

the supremacy of the Party by having a collective leadership (Party and military) at decision-making levels; (3) to strengthen the Party's channels of control; (4) to involve the military in local Party affairs so as to inhibit the idea of exclusiveness in the military; and (5) to specifically make the Party responsible for defining military strategy, doctrine and theory.⁴⁷

It was during this phase that a debate over "laws of military science" began. Almost thirty years had passed with no open discussions of military theory by military men. Until 1953, Stalin had been directly responsible for Soviet military strategy. Following his death, there was a void in the area of military science. After the Soviets exploded their first hydrogen bomb in late 1953, there was a spontaneous interest displayed in the subject of military science. It was not until the denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev in 1956 that Soviet military thought was looked at with any depth. Military history faculties were reorganized at the military academies to reevaluate the subject. The Soviet generals began to analyze the use of nuclear weapons in their military maneuvers. By 1958, the General Staff held secret discussions on problems which they anticipated in any future war. The following year, 1959, it was agreed upon at the highest levels that Soviet military doctrine should be revised. The advent of the

⁴⁷Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, pp. 135-138.

ballistic missile was about to change the entire structure and doctrine of the Soviet military.⁴⁸

Prior to 1960, although there was a growing emphasis on Soviet strategic nuclear power, the established belief in the importance of large theater forces was not really challenged. Nuclear weapons were considered as a supplement to the capabilities of traditional conventional forces. Therefore, some of the major events in the affairs of the Soviet military involved reductions in the size of the traditional forces.

The first troop demobilization program began in 1955 and lasted almost two years. Supposedly, the Soviet military was cut by 1,840,000 men from the 1955 total of 5,700,000 men. It was carried out in an effort to relieve international tensions as well as provide additional manpower to the civilian sector of the economy. The second overall troop reduction was carried out in 1958 and 1959. It accompanied the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in 1958. It was announced that 300,000 men were released from the military, bringing the size of the armed forces at the end of 1959 to 3,600,000 men. The Soviets never announced what percentage of the cutback involved Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.⁴⁹ It is possible the cutbacks allowed for a decrease in "quantity" while "quality" of weapons improved drastically.

⁴⁸Harriet Fast Scott, Editor's Introduction to Soviet Military Strategy, 3d ed., by V. D. Sokolovskiy (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1968), p. xix.

⁴⁹Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 164-166.

The testing of the first-generation Soviet ICBM began in the fall of 1957. The missile had many shortcomings, however, as it was large, unwieldy and required above-ground emplacement. Khrushchev did not invest heavily in the first-generation ICBM as he apparently had hopes for an improved second-generation missile. From 1957 to 1961, only a handful of missiles were deployed. Several other factors probably affected the decision to delay large-scale deployment of the first ICBM - economic pressures, bureaucratic opposition and the U.S. lead in nuclear weaponry.⁵⁰

Khrushchev also faced a decision on the future of the strategic bomber program. The program, initiated under Stalin, had reached a point where a decision had to be made as to the future size of the bomber force. The Soviets had a new medium jet bomber, the TU-16 BADGER, and two intercontinental heavy bombers, the Mya-4 BISON turbojet and the TU-95 BEAR turboprop. Khrushchev apparently decided the Soviets should have a modest intercontinental bomber force with a larger medium-range bomber force to use against Europe. By the late 1950's, 150 to 200 BEAR and BISON were in the inventory in addition to about 1,000 BADGER medium bombers which replaced the old TU-4 BULL. (U.S. analysts erroneously estimated the Soviets would build 600 to 700 long-range bombers.) Though almost numerically equivalent, the Soviet bomber force was no match for the U.S. long-range bomber force.⁵¹

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 182.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 176-178.

The Soviet air defense grew in size and importance during the U.S. effort to develop a strong bomber force. Under Khrushchev, the Soviets carried out a major reorganization of the air defense forces in 1955 and the PVO Strany (Soviet air defense system) became a separate component of the armed forces. Khrushchev stressed improvements that provided new and more advanced interceptors as well as technical improvement of warning and control facilities. The supersonic MIG-19 FARMER entered operational service in 1955 with some models possessing all-weather capabilities. New Soviet aircraft were unveiled at the 1956 Moscow Airshow which were to enter service with PVO in the 1960's. Yet, the Soviets did not rely entirely on interceptors as they developed surface-to-air missiles.

The Soviets built a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system to provide all-weather defense against attack by enemy bombers. Initial SAM deployment was around Moscow itself with the SA-1. However, the SA-1 was designed for use against high-altitude targets and was no good against low-altitude targets. The Soviets also were concerned with defense against strategic missile attack. In the late 1950's, work began on the development of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. It did not become a reality before the 1960's.⁵² Soviet concern with defense against a nuclear attack was a primary theme during this phase.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 184-185.

In 1954 the Soviet leadership reevaluated the Soviet Navy, and it was decided that the dangers of a surprise nuclear attack were greater than those of a seaborne invasion threat. The result was the decision to rely on long-range cruise missiles to be carried by small-to-medium surface ships, diesel submarines and airplanes. (These cruise missiles still had yet to be developed.) Once the decision was made, the plan had to be implemented.

Khrushchev gave the task of implementing the reorganization of the Navy to Admiral S. G. Gorshkov. (He replaced Kuznetsov as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in early 1956.) Construction of cruisers was halted and the mass production of medium-type submarines was slowed to an eventual halt. Although construction of destroyer-escorts and subchasers was completed, the follow-on programs were delayed four years. Seven of the thirteen largest building ways were converted to construction of merchant and fishing ships. The Navy was to engage carrier task forces within range of Soviet air cover by launching cruise missiles. If the concept had been carried through to completion, the Navy would have been, with the exception of strategic missile submarines in the future, a totally defensive navy restricted to home waters.⁵³

In 1958, increases in the range of U.S. carrier-based aircraft meant they could strike the USSR from the eastern

⁵³Senate Committee on Commerce and National Ocean Policy Study, Report on Soviet Oceans Development, S. Res. 222, 94th Congress, 2d Session, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy" by Michael McGwire, pp. 81-82 (1976).

Mediterranean and the Norwegian Sea. The Soviets reversed their plans for their "new" concept of operations and decided to rely on nuclear submarines that would be delivered in the 1960's. Additionally, the Soviets realized the need for improvements in their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The need to extend the range of their ASW forces brought about plans for helicopter carriers which would not become operational until the 1970's.⁵⁴

To summarize, Soviet strategy during the period 1953 to 1959 broke away from Stalin's idea of continental defense and consolidation of gains in the postwar socialist bloc. Though hindered by bureaucratic infighting as a result of the struggle for political succession following the death of Stalin, the military was able to break years of silence and began to question the changes in military science brought about by nuclear weapons. It was during this phase that Soviet leaders were faced with decisions concerning the future structure and force composition of the armed forces. They were required to establish priorities in development of future weapons systems to include planning for size of force. In effect, the Soviet military was suffering its greatest growing pains. By the late 1950's Khrushchev attempted to transform the Soviet successes in space (SPUTNIK I and II) into a political offensive by using the Soviet military might as a bargaining chip. He extended his interests beyond just domestic affairs to the international

⁵⁴Ibid.

arena with the implied support of a "modern Russian military force." He waged "conflict" at all levels short of actual war by both verbal and implied threats of military force. Yet, the Soviets realized what the consequences would be if a nuclear war broke out and avoided it at all costs.

IV. PHASE THREE: 1960-1967

The third phase of the post-World War II Soviet affairs to be surveyed coincides approximately with Khrushchev's last five years in power (1960-1964) and the first two to three years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Militarily, it was during this phase, at least during the Khrushchev years, that the Soviets turned towards a nuclear strategy which saw the rise of the Strategic Rocket Forces with less emphasis on the historically important conventional forces - primarily the Red Army. Politically, Khrushchev continued his pursuit of a global strategy in the wake of Soviet space accomplishments in the late 1950's which he attempted to equate with military power. Khrushchev suffered serious setbacks, both within the Socialist world and without, in rather serious confrontations with the United States and Western powers. Domestically, his regime suffered from economic and agricultural problems. While his successors did not drastically change Soviet affairs per se, they did pursue more cautious policies. In effect, Brezhnev and Kosygin were forced to work with what Khrushchev had left them and did not immediately make any major changes in Soviet affairs.

A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES

From 1958 until the middle of 1960, the Soviets attempted to translate the achievements of 1957 - the orbiting of the

first space satellite and testing of the first intercontinental ballistic missile - into a political advantage in foreign affairs. The result went from the extreme of applying pressure in Berlin in 1958 - hoping to gain political concessions - to less critical foreign affairs involving increased efforts to develop Soviet influence in the new nations of Africa and Asia.

Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. in October 1959 appeared to set the stage for future U.S.-Soviet relations. The "spirit of Camp David" seemed to offer hope for the solutions of some of the problems the Soviets faced in foreign affairs - mainly Berlin-West Germany. In an apparent display of East-West detente, plans were made for a summit meeting in 1960.

Unfortunately, 1960 did not produce a continuation of "the spirit of Camp David." Following the U-2 incident early in May 1960 and the collapse of the Summit Conference later that month, it was obvious Khrushchev was not going to get U.S. concessions on Berlin or East Germany with or without Soviet achievements in space and missile weaponry. Just the opposite happened: The U.S., sensing a "missile gap," intensified its efforts in missile weaponry. Following the testing of its first intercontinental missile and the launching of the first Polaris submarine, the U.S. began missile production efforts such that the strategic balance was in their favor in the years to follow. The result was that, rather than capitalizing on the publicity of the scientific achievements of 1957, the

Soviets were adversely affected.⁵⁵ Unfortunately for the Soviets, there were other problems developing in their "back yard."

A Sino-Soviet rift had been growing for several years. The USSR had played a role in Communist Party affairs in China since well before World War II. However, it was not until the late 1950's that trouble began to appear. Peking was concerned with military (i.e., nuclear) aid from the Soviets as well as Soviet support of the Peking policy regarding Taiwan. Khrushchev apparently believed that if he could keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Communist Chinese, the West would do the same with respect to West Germany. In June 1959, the Soviets tore up the 1957 nuclear sharing agreement with the Chinese. During their visit in Peking in October, after his U.S. visit, Khrushchev hinted that a "two-China" solution should be accepted. By the spring of 1960, the Chinese were indirectly criticizing the Soviets in writing with more direct and open criticism at international meetings later in the year. To make matters worse, the small Eastern European country of Albania supported the Chinese. The giant - the Soviet Union - was criticized and embarrassed by a small, insignificant country - Albania - and could do little about it because of the Chinese Communists. In August of 1960, the Soviets withdrew all

⁵⁵Marshall D. Schulman, "Recent Soviet Foreign Policy: Some Patterns in Retrospect," in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Erik P. Hoffman and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr. (New York: Adeline-Atherton, Inc., 1971), pp. 452-453.

technicians from China and terminated technical assistance programs.⁵⁶ Peking accused the Soviets of being "revisionists" and not following the ideals of Lenin. Yet, there was no clean break between the two countries - Peking remained a growing thorn in Khrushchev's side. He was aware of the importance of the appearance of unity between the USSR and PRC as he devised new plans for dealing with the west.

Following the Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba in April 1961, Khrushchev apparently felt he could frighten the young President Kennedy. At a meeting of the two leaders in Vienna in June, Khrushchev threatened to sign a treaty with East Germany in December if there was no treaty with West Germany by then. If the East German treaty was signed, the Western powers would have had to negotiate access to Berlin with the East German government. Additionally, Khrushchev told Kennedy that the U.S. would have to accept Soviet conditions for a nuclear test ban. Kennedy was supposedly expected to bow to the Soviet demands.

The U.S. reaction to threats concerning Berlin was not as the Soviets must have expected. Instead of quaking in fear, the U.S. showed its resolve and recalled some of its reserve forces. The Soviets, in turn, recalled some reservists. Soviet threats and pressures continued - along with the construction of the Berlin Wall - and included interference with Western

⁵⁶Harry Gelman, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict," in The China Reader: Communist China, Revolutionary Reconstruction and International Confrontations, ed. Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell. (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 275-280.

air routes into Berlin and actual confrontations between Western and Soviet tank units in Berlin. Escalation of the crisis became more possible each day.

In an obvious attempt to put more pressure on the West, the USSR ended the three-year moratorium on nuclear testing in August with an explosion of the largest nuclear device yet tested by any power. The U.S. responded with its own nuclear testing and development of more advanced missiles. The U.S. was obviously quite concerned with the crisis in Berlin as well as the dramatic Soviet nuclear testing. However, the U.S. did not back down as the Soviets expected. Rather, the Soviets were forced to "cool" the situation.⁵⁷

Khrushchev cooled the Berlin situation when he sent a personal note to Kennedy in September of 1961. The Soviet appearance at the reopening of disarmament negotiations in March of 1962 seemed to reduce tensions even further. However, 1962 was to be the year of Khrushchev's most daring efforts to achieve a nuclear parity. In the summer and fall of that year the Soviets attempted a short-cut towards that parity by the emplacement of medium and short-range missiles in Cuba. By targeting the U.S. from Cuba, the Soviets would have been able to find a "fix" for their lack of intercontinental missiles. However, in the face of U.S. resolve the plan was aborted and the missiles were returned to the USSR. The world sat and watched the worst crisis in international affairs since World

⁵⁷Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973, 2nd Ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 650-655.

War II subside.⁵⁸ Not only were his plans foiled, Khrushchev's reputation both in the Soviet Union and throughout the Socialist bloc suffered.

Following the Cuban missile crisis, the foreign policy of the USSR showed a definite shift in emphasis over the next two years. As a result of the crisis, several steps were taken to improve detente. Rather than attempt to specifically reduce U.S. military effort and cohesion of the Western powers, the Soviets turned to measures that appeared to lessen the conflict relationship with the U.S. while reducing the risk of general war and limiting the amount of military expenditures required. Khrushchev became more willing to discuss arms control measures. In July 1963, he accepted a U.S. proposal for a test ban in outer space, the atmosphere and under water. Additionally, the Soviets agreed to a "hot line" between Washington, D.C. and Moscow. Even when serious problems did arise, it seemed obvious the Soviets wanted to maintain a relationship of diminished tension with the West. Yet, the Soviets were not able to solve all of their problems in the Socialist bloc itself.

The Sino-Soviet rift had grown in dimension with open disagreement. The Soviets were concerned with Chinese activities in Africa and were more than a little concerned with the encouragement to follow more independent lines given by the Chinese to the East European states. This was particularly

⁵⁸Schulman, "Recent Soviet Foreign Policy," pp. 455-456.

true with Romania. The Soviet leadership was occupied with the problem of the Socialist bloc as well as worsening domestic affairs.

In November 1962, Khrushchev announced a division of the Party into industrial and agricultural sections which no one knew how to make work. Agriculture was doing poorly and the Soviets were forced to import grain after the poor harvest of 1963. This was particularly embarrassing to Khrushchev who had "guaranteed" the Soviet people an improvement in their standard of living. His plans for corn, "virgin lands" and other expedients were not successful. But his domestic problem, coupled with his diminishing control of the Socialist bloc, led to his resignation in October 1964.⁵⁹

The new team which took over from Khrushchev - Brezhnev and Kosygin - were in contrast very cautious bureaucrats who were selected for that reason. The new leaders stressed that they would determine the future of the Soviet Union. There even appeared to be a lull in the rift between the Soviets and Chinese.

Peking was elated with the departure of Khrushchev. (Additionally, on the day Khrushchev was removed from office, the Chinese exploded their first nuclear device.) For a few short months there was detente in Sino-Soviet relations. However, the massive intervention in Vietnam by the U.S. in 1965 brought about a new problem between the Communist giants.

⁵⁹Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, pp. 481-483.

Kosygin visited Hanoi early in 1965 and offered military aid to the North Vietnamese. But, Kosygin also stressed the importance of negotiations at a Geneva conference in order to solve the Vietnam issue. The Chinese were totally against negotiation and saw the offer of Soviet aid to Hanoi as an attempt to maintain Soviet leverage in the area. Peking wanted Moscow to pressure the U.S. elsewhere - possibly in Germany. Relations worsened as the Chinese hindered the movement of Soviet supplies to North Vietnam. The rift between the nations was active and growing and affected Soviet perception of affairs across the Asian continent.

The year 1965 presented other problems to the Soviets in Asia. Soviet reaction to the India-Pakistan clash of 1965 and the consequences of a coup d'etat by the Indonesian Communists which saw the strongest communist party in an Asian non-communist state erased, was dictated almost entirely by the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Soviets, rather than taking sides, acted as a mediator between India and Pakistan and therefore enhanced their standing in both countries. Following the elimination of the communist party in Indonesia, the Soviets did virtually nothing. In both events, the Soviets were afraid that any expansion of communism in those areas would eventually be to China's advantage. In essence, Russia had a policy of "containment" of Asian communism.⁶⁰

⁶⁰Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 695-710.

While the problem of China appeared most urgent, the Brezhnev-Kosygin team also turned to domestic problems. The new regime reversed many of Khrushchev's agricultural policies. In October 1965, new economic reforms were instituted. The XXIII Party Congress held in 1966 outlined a Five-Year Plan providing for the first time a higher percentage rise in consumer goods than in producers' goods.⁶¹

Thus, after two years in power, the Brezhnev-Kosygin team appeared to be involved in improving domestic affairs and were deeply concerned with problems in the Socialist bloc, particularly China. During this period they continued to follow the 1964 foreign policy of Khrushchev - mainly that of peaceful coexistence.

In summary, the period 1960-1967 saw the Soviet Union move from the rather brash and sometimes adventurist foreign policy of Khrushchev in the early 1960's to a more cautious foreign policy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Dr. Vernon Aspaturian provides an excellent summary of Khrushchev's global strategy.

While Khrushchev transformed the Soviet Union into a global power, he did it at the expense of weakening Soviet control in its own sphere, alienating Moscow's strongest ally, China, overcommitting the power and resources of the Soviet Union, and increasing the danger of thermonuclear war by his persistent prodding and probing of weak spots in the Western world and forcing the United States into a series of confrontations, in the hope that this would result in the settlement of outstanding issues on Soviet terms and force the United States to withdraw from exposed positions....⁶²

⁶¹Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, pp. 485-486.

⁶²Vernon V. Aspaturian, "A Half Century of Soviet Foreign Policy," Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy, ed. Vernon V. Aspaturian (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 108.

Following an act like Nikita Khrushchev, the Brezhnev-Kosygin team could hardly be anything but cautious in carrying out a transfer of power.

B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY

During the late 1950's, Soviet military affairs became a subject of many discussions and studies in the USSR. Of particular interest were the problems of military strategy. The Soviet military leadership was at last acknowledging that the tactics and strategies of World War II were no longer valid with the advent of nuclear weapons. It was not until early 1960 that a new strategy was outlined for the Soviet military.

Speaking before the IV Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 14 January 1960, Khrushchev outlined his new military strategy. He stated that "the general trend is toward reduction of tension in international relations" and "under present conditions war is no longer completely inevitable."⁶³ These statements were obviously made in light of the events of 1959 - the meeting at Camp David, plans for a Summit conference in 1960 and his talk of disarmament. The strategy he outlined in his speech can be summarized as follows:

(I) A future war could only be a total war, without any restrictions on the use of thermonuclear weapons.

(II) Thanks to the development of rockets, the initial phase of such a war could no longer resemble that of previous wars since an aggressor could now strike immediately at the whole territory of the adversary.

⁶³ Roman Kolkowicz, "The Military," in Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, ed. H. Gordon Skilling & Franklyn Griffiths. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 160.

(III) The answer for a country such as the USSR...was to take advantage of its vast territory to disperse its strike force and, relying on their dispersal and also on a well developed antiaircraft defense system, to have at its disposal a sufficient retaliatory force to annihilate the aggressors.⁶⁴

The impact of the new strategy on traditional conventional military forces was tremendous. In essence, Khrushchev said that the Air Force and surface Navy were outdated. Furthermore, future nuclear war made it unnecessary for the USSR to maintain a large ground force as there would no longer be battles to defend the nation's borders. Khrushchev believed that only a limited Army was required and could possibly be organized using a territorial system. All of these points led to an announced reduction in military strength from 3.6 million to 2.4 million men over an eighteen month period, including 250,000 officers.⁶⁵

While the conventional force - the Army, the surface Navy and tactical Air Force - took the brunt of the force reductions, a new service was born - the Strategic Rocket Forces. Emphasis was placed on a new strike force based on strategic missiles, strategic air defense at a submarine fleet equipped with nuclear weapons. An obvious conflict developed between the proponents of the new nuclear strategy and the proponents of the traditional conventional forces. The military was not only concerned with the impact on many of its officers as they

⁶⁴Michael Garder, A History of the Soviet Army, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 149.

⁶⁵Ibid.

were "cast out into an unfriendly social environment" after becoming accustomed to the high social status of an officer; they were also deeply concerned that emphasis on strategic nuclear forces would adversely affect the mobility and responsiveness of the Soviet forces.⁶⁶

As a result of changes on the international scene in the months that followed Khrushchev's announced strategy change, the urgency in carrying out the changes diminished. The military resistance to his new strategy was also reduced as events brought about reconsideration of Khrushchev's plans. The U-2 incident in May 1960, though it did not apparently change any force reduction plans, provided the military the first opportunity to speak out. The U.S. effort in early 1961 to acquire a balanced military posture by improving its neglected conventional forces did cause Khrushchev's cutbacks to lose momentum. The Berlin affair later that year led both the U.S. and USSR to call up reserve forces. By July of 1961 the Soviet leaders formally suspended the force reduction announced in January 1960. Actually, the Soviet military strength increased as many routine discharges were delayed. Though more of a political move, the rejection of the three-year moratorium on nuclear testing by the Soviets in September 1961 was favored by the military. While 1962 brought the release of the forces augmented in 1961, it also saw the development of a crisis in Cuba.⁶⁷

⁶⁶Kolkowicz, "The Military," pp. 161-162.

⁶⁷Raymond Garthoff, "Military Power in Soviet Policy," pp. 252-253.

As discussed earlier, the Cuban missile crisis was an unsuccessful attempt to find a short-cut to nuclear parity for the Soviets. Militarily, the Soviets became acutely aware of their inability to project their foreign policy on a global plan. Additionally, the Soviets were forced to admit through their action that the U.S. did have strategic superiority and that the reliance on nuclear armed missiles had not been a decisive factor in the conduct of the crisis.

In analyzing the impact of the "nuclear missile strategy" on the military, it appears that there was something of a compromise with respect to the conventional forces - particularly those stationed in Eastern Europe. While troop reduction did occur, the cuts were generally in connection with the introduction of new weapons. It was generally second-line units in the interior military districts of the USSR that were reduced in size. The most radical reform - and what might be called the real compromise between Khrushchev and the military - was the effort to modernize theater forces by stressing greater battlefield firepower and mobility under nuclear conditions. In effect, the theater forces were provided with capabilities for both conventional and nuclear warfare by supplementing those units with tactical nuclear rockets and missiles with ranges from about 10 to 300 miles as well as nuclear-armed tactical aircraft. The idea of "nuclearizing" the theater forces was opposed by some military leaders as it was believed that those forces would be poorly prepared to conduct extensive

conventional campaigns because of increasing reliance on nuclear firepower.⁶⁸

In addition to streamlining the theater forces in Eastern Europe, the Soviets reappraised the capabilities of the East European armies. Following the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Soviets began a reinforcement of the Warsaw Pact. In addition to modernizing and integrating the armies in a joint organization, the Soviets began to look at the actual contribution that could be expected from the East European armies in the event of war in Europe. By strengthening the cohesion of these armies, the Soviets were able to bring about a reduction of Soviet ground forces in that theater.⁶⁹ The question still remained, however, as to the reliability and responsiveness of these armies to Soviet direction.

In December of 1963, Khrushchev again called for reduction in military spending and manpower. This manpower cut was not only a display of Khrushchev's attitude towards detente, but also was an effort to find money to bolster the sagging civilian economy. The military again felt threatened but found that both domestic and foreign affairs favored their cause. Growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam (which meant increased U.S. expenditures on their military forces) and an increase in Sino-Soviet tension, which threatened to lead to open conflict, kept the discussion of the need for a strong military from fading.⁷⁰

⁶⁸Wolfe, Soviet Power, pp. 148-150.

⁶⁹Gardner, A History of the Soviet Army, p. 150.

⁷⁰Kolkowicz. The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, pp. 293-298.

Khrushchev, however, again began to question the utility and expense of maintaining "pure" conventional forces such as tanks which were so vulnerable to anti-tank weapons. In fact, he abolished the ground forces command in September 1964 as a separate command and subordinated these forces directly to the General Staff in the Ministry of Defense, supposedly as an effort to streamline the defense establishment.⁷¹ The Soviet military hierarchy was extremely unhappy and concerned with Khrushchev's opinion of the military - particularly with respect to size and composition of the Soviet military establishment.

Segments of the Soviet military establishment (particularly the critics of Khrushchev's military policy) must have breathed a sigh of relief when Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964. "Experts" on the Soviet Union throughout the world speculated on a change in Soviet foreign policy leading to renewed militancy. However, there were no dramatic or visible changes in the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Only a few months after the new "team" came to power, the Ministry of Defense published a book, Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs. What was significant was that the book had gone to print before Khrushchev's "departure." Yet, when it was published, with the exception of the deletion of all reference to Khrushchev, the book provided clear indication that the revolution in military affairs, and the associated doctrine and strategy, was to continue.⁷²

⁷¹Wolfe, Soviet Power in Europe, p. 464.

⁷²William F. Scott, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy; Realities and Misunderstandings," Strategic Review, Vol. 3, Summer 1975, p. 60.

The military establishment tolerated for a few months the new regime's statements concerning domestic programs - particularly agriculture, light industry and the food industry. Then, the military began to reassert itself by attempting to show that the world was full of tensions and dangers rather than one of military detente. High investments in heavy industry were stressed in order to support a modern army. Brezhnev and Kosygin eventually chose a middle of the road policy. By July of 1965, Brezhnev stated that it was necessary "to strengthen the country's defense capabilities in light of the international situations."

The state budget for 1966 even showed a five percent increase in defense expenditures over the 1965 budget.⁷³

A discussion of the increase or decrease in the percentage of a budget allocated to defense expenditures does not necessarily give the reader an appreciation for changes in weaponry and military capabilities. The period 1960 to 1967 was one both of change in Soviet strategy and in Soviet weaponry that was to eventually lead to a more versatile and mobile global power.

Under Khrushchev, Soviet military policy was reshaped in stages. Initially, following his announced changes in military strategy in 1960, military programs were oriented towards creating offensive and defensive strategic forces to compete with the U.S. By the end of Khrushchev's regime, military theorists

⁷³Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and Communist Party, pp. 300-303.

recognized the need for mobile and versatile forces. However, there was a failure to formulate a doctrine for limited or "non-nuclear" war due in most respects to Khrushchev's attitude that limited war in which nuclear powers participated had the danger of escalation to a global nuclear war. He believed that only small wars of "national-liberation" should receive indirect Soviet support.

The military aid programs to several "third world" nations outside the Soviet bloc in the late 1950's gave the Soviets a chance to gain experience in military operations, logistics support and communications. By the mid-1960's the Soviets began to study amphibious landing operations along with development of amphibious landing material. The Soviet marine forces, or naval infantry, -was reactivated in 1964 with much publicity. Interest in long-range airlift operations was demonstrated by programs to develop new large transport aircraft such as the AN-22. Additionally, military writers began to discuss airborne landing operations in conjunction with amphibious operations.⁷⁴

During the Khrushchev years, the Soviets realized a steady increase in merchant ship tonnage - from 1.5 million dead-weight tons in 1959 to nearly 6 million at the end of 1964. Militarily, the maritime program "fostered" under Khrushchev aided the Soviets in later achieving global capabilities. The merchant

⁷⁴Thomas W. Wolfe, The Soviet Quest for More Globally Mobile Military Power, Memorandum RM-555-PR, December 1967, The Rand Corporation, pp. 3-6.

ship programs included development of large-hatch cargo ships capable of handling military equipment (as demonstrated during the Cuban missile crisis). However, under Khrushchev "a commensurate program to provide naval means adequate for the protection of Soviet sealift in distant oceans was not realized." The unanswered question was whether a large merchant fleet would eventually require a "blue-water" navy for protection.⁷⁵

The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime in its first three years continued to carry out programs relating to mobility of conventional military forces and to Soviet naval forces. With regard to the latter, the primary emphasis was placed on continued strengthening of the fleet of 400 submarines deployed both on strategic missile platforms and for use in interdiction of seaborne supply lines. The surface force in 1966-1967 consisted of about 20 cruisers, over 100 destroyers and several hundred fast patrol boats. Although receiving a lower priority, some of the craft had been fitted with surface-to-surface and antiaircraft missiles.⁷⁶

Although under the new regime, as of 1966 the Soviets had not apparently begun a massive program of balanced naval expansion; the Soviet navy did carry out some new activities of particular note. Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, Soviet submarines regularly carried out patrols in distant oceans.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 6-7.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 8-9.

In 1966, the Soviets announced a round-the-world cruise by nuclear-powered submarines. The Soviet leaders obviously were becoming more aware of their capabilities to project their naval power.⁷⁷

The Soviets also developed additional capabilities which were to increase their global status. Airborne and airlift reinforcement operations were emphasized in connection with Warsaw Pact exercises. In addition, the increasing amount of aid given the North Vietnamese has provided experience in logistic support, training, and technical backup.

While effort was expended by the new regime on improving conventional global capabilities, it needs to be realized that these efforts were second to the improvements in the nuclear forces. After two years in power, it was apparent that Brezhnev and Kosygin were committed to a substantial buildup of Soviet strategic forces. The attempt to strengthen and improve the Soviet strategic posture greatly overshadowed any improvement in conventional forces. With regard to strategic weaponry, the Soviets attempted to develop a mix between offensive and defensive forces. An accelerated program to construct new ICBM launcher sites was begun. Many of these sites were dispersed and hardened compared to the early "soft site" configuration. Work on new improved missiles was also undertaken.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

⁷⁸ Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 431-433.

While attempts to improve the strategic posture greatly overshadowed the improvements in conventional forces during the period 1960-1967, it is worth noting that all of the military programs viewed together represented a trend. As a result of growing U.S. emphasis on the doctrine of "flexible response," Khrushchev's nuclear strategy was slowly being tempered to include a growing involvement of improved conventional forces. The Soviet Union was moving from a strategic nuclear power towards becoming a global power capable of carrying out a political military response at any level of the spectrum of military force.

V. PHASE FOUR - 1967-1977

The fourth and final phase in Soviet affairs to be surveyed covers the period 1967 to 1977. During this period the Soviet Union achieved recognition by the United States as an "equal" super power. Having achieved nuclear parity, the Soviet leadership has been able to function not only from strength, but also with an assured confidence. In the past ten years, the Soviet Union has projected both its political and military power such that they have played important roles in the affairs of Africa, the Mideast, and Europe. Basically, the Soviets have followed a foreign policy aimed at achieving a global role while maintaining an accommodation with the United States.

A. SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES

In 1967 the war in Vietnam continued to affect Soviet foreign policy, but the danger of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Vietnam appeared to have passed. Soviet aid to the North Vietnamese - costing the Soviets only a fraction of what the Americans were forced to spend on the war - was helping to frustrate the U.S. efforts in that conflict. The Soviets were aware that heavy U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia reduced both the U.S. government's ability and the American people's willingness to become involved in other Soviet activities in the world.

While the Soviets were concerned with affairs in Asia - particularly an escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute - they

became involved in new crises - first in the Middle East and then in Eastern Europe. In the Middle East, the pro-Soviet regime that had seized power in Syria in 1966 and the Egyptian government under Nasser were both receiving aid from the USSR. In June of 1967, after the Israelis defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the Six Day War, the Soviets could do nothing to support their clients except sever relations with Israel. However, the Soviets did go about re-equipping the defeated Arab nations. Kosygin made a trip to the United States and the United Nations during which he unsuccessfully tried to force Israel to withdraw from territory it occupied during the war. As the result of the war, however, the Soviets were more involved than ever in the Middle East and the Soviet-equipped Arab states "were driven into deeper dependence on them."⁷⁹

Elsewhere in the Middle East, in November 1967, the USSR intervened militarily in the Yemeni civil war. This led in the following year to an agreement on military and technical assistance with the new South Yemen government.⁸⁰ Meanwhile, a crisis was developing closer to home.

Problems for the Soviets had been growing in Czechoslovakia for several months before Alexander Dubcek became First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Party in January 1968. Concerned that the Dubcek regime was being pushed from "the road to socialism" - as evidenced by freedom of the press and proclaimed civil

⁷⁹Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, p. 495.

⁸⁰Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1973: A Paradox of Soviet Power, (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 60.

liberties - the Soviets, with Polish, Hungarian, East German and Bulgarian support, attempted to use the threat of military force to bring the Czechoslovak nation back to the fold. This failing, Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia on 20 August 1968. There was little violence, however, and the Soviets took control of the country. Besides insuring that Soviet control of the East European bloc remained intact, the Soviets were able to sign a "treaty" whereby Soviet troops would remain indefinitely in that country.⁸¹ (For a detailed analysis of the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, see Section VI.B., "Czechoslovakia - 1968.")

The Russians described the defense of Czechoslovakia as an international socialist duty. Brezhnev, late in 1968 put forth what has become known as the Brezhnev Doctrine to explain the intervention.

....when internal and external forces, hostile to socialism, seek to reverse the development of any socialist country whatsoever in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole - this already becomes not only a problem of the people of the country concerned, but also a common problem and the concern of all socialist countries.⁸²

While the USSR put forth its "rules of the game" for the "Socialist commonwealth," it was not quite so easy to establish rules for the nuclear power contest that continued to grow between the world's two superpowers. By 1968, it was obvious to both the U.S. and the USSR that something had to be done to

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid., p. 74.

reduce the momentum of the nuclear arms race. In July 1968, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was signed not only by the U.S., USSR and Great Britain but eventually also by West Germany, Japan and numerous other states. (China did not sign and claimed the treaty was proof of Soviet complicity with the American "imperialists.")⁸³ The next logical step for the superpowers was discussion on disarmament.

President Johnson had proposed as early as 1961 that the U.S. and USSR should engage in talks which became known as SALT - Strategic Arms Limitation talks. It was not until mid 1968 that the Soviets accepted the proposal, possibly because it was not until then that the USSR was within reach of rough numerical strategic parity. In January 1969, both the U.S. and USSR expressed readiness to begin talks. (Nixon referred to a doctrine of "strategic sufficiency" which in effect renounced the U.S. claim to strategic superiority.)

SALT talks began in Helsinki in November 1969. Of concern to the superpowers was that three technological developments - new and more precise guidance systems increasing missile accuracy, multiple re-entry vehicles (particularly multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles) and anti-ballistic missile systems - made it conceivable that a first-strike attack by one of the two powers might be successful. The SALT talks continued into 1970. (A Soviet-American agreement was

⁸³Wladyslaw W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documental Analysis, 1964-1972, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973), pp. 43-44.

signed in October 1969 on banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed.)⁸⁴

An extremely important treaty of another type was signed in August 1970. This treaty - the Treaty of Moscow - was signed between the USSR and West Germany and formed what is generally a "de facto" European peace settlement. The treaty was a mutual renunciation of force and the recognition of the frontiers in Europe existing as a result of World War II.⁸⁵ Thus, Soviet relations on the Western front improved while there was concern on the other front - with China.

In 1969, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated drastically. In March, border clashes erupted along the Ussuri River. In August, there were more clashes along the Sinkiang frontier. There was speculation in the world that the USSR and China were moving towards a military showdown. Such a war, however, would have been against one of the fundamental tenets of the Marxist-Leninist theory: that war is a product of the capitalist order - not to be fought between two socialist states. By the end of the year, the two sides agreed to try to settle their differences. The coming months were to show how unsuccessful those attempts were to be.⁸⁶

The Soviets were again extremely active in the Mideast and North Africa in 1971. Continuing to supply the Egyptians -

⁸⁴Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1973, pp. 79-80.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 93-95.

⁸⁶Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, pp. 259-260.

particularly the deployment of a large air defense system of fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles the year before - the Soviets increased their influence in the area. By the end of the year, the Soviets were supplying arms to Lebanon, Syria, Morocco and Algeria. The Sudanese, however, left the Soviet camp and turned towards the Chinese.⁸⁷ The Soviets suffered another defeat when Sadat demanded the withdrawal of all (almost 17,000 total) Soviet military advisors from Egypt the following year.⁸⁸

While achieving gains and suffering losses with the Third World nations, the Soviets continued to reduce the risk of a confrontation with the U.S. In 1972, two important bilateral military agreements were concluded with the Americans: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM's) and the interim agreement relating to the limitation of strategic offensive arms (to last five years). The ABM treaty took one extremely expensive weapon system out of the arms race while the interim agreement was a holding operation in which a limit was placed on the number of strategic offensive weapons each side could possess - the Soviets being allowed a numerical superiority in operational ICBM's and SLBM's.⁸⁹ It was obvious Brezhnev and Kosygin wanted assurances against a nuclear conflict between the two nations.

⁸⁷Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962-1973, p. 106.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 120.

⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 114-116.

The following year, 1973, three additional nuclear agreements were signed. The first agreement - to last ten years - related to the peaceful use of atomic energy. The second agreement, a Soviet initiative - and of unlimited duration - binds the U.S. and USSR "to proceed from the premise that each party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party, and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security." The third agreement committed the two governments to undertake serious efforts toward reaching a permanent limitation on strategic offensive arms agreement with the possibility of signing such a treaty in 1974.⁹⁰

The relationship between the two superpowers was tested only a few months later when war again broke out in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs. While the war lasted only from the sixth to the twenty-fifth of October, both the U.S. and USSR became deeply involved. However, while each of the two powers resupplied their respective allies through impressive airlift operations, they also conferred with each other. Additionally, both powers supported resolutions in the United Nations to bring about a ceasefire.⁹¹ With a ceasefire came a reduction in tension among all parties involved. And, it would appear the U.S.-USSR relations had not suffered greatly.

The following summer - 1974 - during President Nixon's trip to the USSR, other agreements were reached between the

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 131-133.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 144-147.

the Soviets and Americans. These treaties included the Treaty of 3 July banning the underground testing of nuclear weapons with a yield in excess of 150 kilotons; the Protocol to the 1972 ABM treaty in which both sides agreed to limit ABM deployment to almost half of what was allowed by the 1972 treaty; an agreement to begin negotiations on environmental warfare; and an agreement to work toward a limitation on strategic arms agreement covering the period until 1985. Also, the two governments agreed to consider a joint initiative regarding chemical warfare.⁹² These results of Soviet foreign policy would seem to indicate that the USSR was achieving all of its goals.

While the Soviets had what appeared to be an active and successful foreign policy, the USSR was suffering economic problems. The Soviets admitted in 1969 that the key problem was to increase productivity. They needed new methods to replace the quantitative approach to their economy. In addition, they had to look beyond their own borders for assistance.

During the early 1970's, Soviet trade with several countries throughout the world increased substantially. In 1972, they signed a three-year grain agreement with the U.S. This was followed by a five-year agreement with a U.S. oil company for the joint development of Soviet oil and natural gas. Soviet trade also increased sharply with Japan as the two countries discussed joint efforts to drill for oil and natural gas

⁹²Ibid., pp. 176-177.

in Siberia. In 1973, a ten-year economic agreement was signed with West Germany involving the development of economic, industrial and technological cooperation between the U.S. and USSR was signed in 1974.

Though it would seem that U.S.-Soviet relations were constantly improving, there was actually a stagnation of detente and a cooling of relations in 1975 and 1976. There were various indicators of the trend: the deadlock in SALT talks, the postponement of Brezhnev's trip to the U.S., the Soviet cancellation of the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement (January 1975), and U.S. reactions to Soviet affairs in Africa.

Soviet foreign policy in Africa has become a sore point with the West in the past two to three years. The Soviets actually began a more vigorous program in Africa in about 1972. Worried over Chinese successes on that continent, the Soviets expanded their own operation.

The greatest increase in Soviet activity in Africa came following the collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974. Angola, one of Portugal's African colonies, was immersed in a three-way fight for political and military power involving three competing insurgent movements. The Soviets provided military support to one of the factions - the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). By early 1975, the Soviets were sending substantial military supplies to the MPLA and later in the year the Soviets introduced Cuban "advisors" into the country.⁹³ The result of the Soviet effort in Angola was an

⁹³Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 4, July 1976, pp. 749-750.

awareness in the West of the obvious improvements in Soviet global military capability, particularly the growth of Soviet conventional power. The spectre of "the Soviet threat" had been revived. (For a detailed analysis of the Soviet military involvement in Angola, see Section VI.C."Angola - 1974-1976".)

In summarizing the ten years of Soviet foreign policy from 1967 to 1977, one point stands out - the Soviet awareness of the importance of the West to affairs in the Soviet Union. Once the Soviets achieved some semblance of nuclear parity, it was to their advantage to agree to limiting the nuclear arms race. Military spending was taking a large portion of their budget during a period in which the economy was suffering setbacks. With the threat of nuclear war reduced, the Soviets more easily accepted the fact that they needed Western technology and "know how" to bolster their economy. Agricultural setbacks forced them to turn to the West for supplies of grain. While they presented a good appearance in the spotlight on the center of the stage, they nevertheless were increasing their efforts in the wings - with Third World nations. It is the Soviet affairs in the "wings" that have the West questioning Soviet intentions.

B. SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND STRATEGY

The decade 1967-1977 saw the USSR achieve nuclear parity (and more) with the U.S. while expanding their conventional military forces. While it is understandable that the Soviets would strive to achieve at least parity in strategic nuclear

capabilities, their goals with respect to improvements and increases in conventional military forces are not as easily explained. In response to the West's strategy of "flexible response," the Soviets modified their doctrine based solely on nuclear weaponry to include the requirement for their armed forces to have the capability to fight with or without nuclear weapons. The ground forces were reinstated as a separate command early in this phase. However, improvements in tactical fighting aircraft, strategic airlift, reconnaissance, and their "blue water" navy have been of the kind generally designed for force projection and employment beyond a nation's borders. All of the improvements of these conventional forces have been carried out without apparently jeopardizing the continued improvement of nuclear strategic forces which retain top priority in Soviet strategy.

The decade 1967-1977 saw the actual deployment of Soviet conventional force more than any time since the end of World War II. It involved not only deployment of forces to Eastern Europe and the Soviet borders with China, but also the deployment of advisors, technicians and military hardware to non-bloc countries. Brezhnev and Kosygin continued the policy of re-equipping and modernizing the forces in the Warsaw Pact - both Soviet forces and the individual national forces - primarily those of Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany - with both conventional forces and tactical nuclear missiles. Maneuvers testing those forces became more frequent than during the Khrushchev years. On the opposite front, the Soviets became

more and more fearful of trouble with China. In 1968 it was estimated that there were fifteen Soviet divisions along the Chinese border and in Mongolia. However, after several border incidents, by late 1971 the number of Soviet divisions along the same frontier was estimated to have increased to forty-four - more Soviet divisions than in Eastern Europe.⁹⁴

Other than border skirmishes, the Soviets have deployed combat forces twice since 1967. As mentioned earlier, they intervened militarily in the civil war in Yemen in late 1967. However, the military intervention in Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and military units of the Warsaw Pact was not only of a more serious nature but also was carried out on a far greater scale. The West - which "stood back and did nothing" - was treated to a display of Soviet military capability that had not been seen before. For the Soviets, it was like conducting a final exam following extensive maneuvers in and around Czechoslovakia. For the first time the Soviets displayed an airlift capability of modest, but growing proportions. Also, the experience in logistical support for such an operation was invaluable to the Soviets.

The Soviets gained military experience - and prestige - in other ways, however. As mentioned earlier, they became very involved in both the Middle East and Africa, providing military weapons, supplies, and in many cases, military advisors to Third World nations. While the policy of supplying arms to

⁹⁴Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 110.

such countries has primarily been for political purposes, there have been economic gains also. By 1971-1972, the USSR surpassed the U.S. in supplies of major weapons to other countries. During 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the West was provided an impressive display of the capabilities of Soviet weaponry which had been supplied to the Arab nations. The West began to take a second look at the supply of Soviet arms throughout Africa. The Khadafy regime in Libya and the Amin government in Uganda, both nations possessing questionable motives, began receiving Soviet arms. However, the Soviet support of the MPLA in Angola registered the greatest response from the West. If nothing else, the West realized for the first time the global capabilities that the Soviets possessed.

A chronological discussion of the development of the Soviet conventional forces over the past ten years is not as important as a review of what has actually been accomplished by the USSR in expanding their global conventional capabilities to meet their foreign policy commitments in the past decade. As the late Marshal A. A. Grechko stated in February 1974:

....The Soviet Armed Forces are continuing persistently to achieve military mastery and they are maintaining constant readiness to repel any aggression no matter from where and from whom it comes.⁹⁵

In May 1974, Grechko was quoted in another article:

At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted merely by their function in defending our Motherland and the other

⁹⁵William F. Scott, "The USSR's Growing Global Mobility," Air Force Magazine, March 1977, p. 57.

socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state actively purposely opposes the export of counter-revolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national-liberation struggle, and resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear. ⁹⁶

With these important statements in mind, a "scorecard" will be presented to provide the reader an appreciation of the growth in Soviet conventional forces and global capabilities.

The Soviet ground forces have been expanded and strengthened by a substantial increase in the number of tanks, tactical missiles and artillery pieces in the past few years. The ground forces have increased by 800,000 men since 1965, with an increase in total active divisions from 148 to 170 in the same time-frame. Some of the increase came about because of the buildup on the Sino-Soviet border. After the Czechoslovak affair in 1968, Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe increased from 22 to 27. Authorized strengths of tank and motorized rifle divisions increased by 500 to 1,000 men per division. The number of main battle tanks per division has increased considerably. The introduction of the modern T-72 tank began in 1976 and by the end of that year over 2,000 had been produced. Additionally, the ground forces have been equipped with the innovative BMP infantry vehicle, new 122mm and 152mm self-propelled howitzers, and several new divisional surface-to-air missiles (both vehicle mounted and portable). Tactical nuclear capabilities have increased with the introduction of

⁹⁶ Ibid.

the new short-range missiles.⁹⁷ Of particular note is the stress the Soviets have put on tactical bridging capability. Considerable resources have been devoted to river-crossing equipment. Additionally, a river-crossing capability is built into most Soviet combat vehicles.⁹⁸

The Soviet naval forces have also undergone major growth and improvement in the past ten years. Between 1967 and 1973, the USSR introduced nearly a dozen major new classes of warships, including the missile-armed MOSKVA and LENINGRAD helicopter carriers, guided missile cruisers, a multi-missile cruiser and two new classes of ballistic missile submarines (YANKEE and DELTA). As a result, the number of major Soviet warships afloat (221) exceeded that of the U.S. (174) for the first time in history. In late 1973 the first Soviet aircraft carrier (KIEV) was launched. The KIEV will carry both helicopters and a new V/STOL (vertical and short-takeoff and landing) aircraft, the Yak-36 (FORGER).⁹⁹ The Soviets most certainly were acquiring the capability to fight a naval action.

Admiral Gorshkov, in his book, The Sea Power and the State, published in 1976, expanded on the basic idea that a navy must be capable of fighting naval actions at sea.

⁹⁷General George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1978, prepared 20 January 1977, pp. 60-61

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 69

⁹⁹Michael T. Klare, "Superpower Rivalry at Sea," Foreign Policy, Winter 1975-76, p. 88.

Demonstrative actions of the fleet in many cases make it possible to achieve political goals without resorting to armed conflict by just indicating pressure by their potential might and the threat of beginning military actions....

Moreover, the neutral waters of the world's oceans permit accomplishing the transfer and concentration of forces of the fleet without giving the opposing side formal ground for protests or other forms of counter-action.¹⁰⁰

Since the mid 1960's the USSR has kept a significant portion of its Black Sea fleet in the Mediterranean (anywhere from 50 to 90 vessels). Additionally, the Soviets have increased the visits by their warships to ports of other countries. This has been particularly true in the Indian Ocean. However, although the Soviets have naval-basing facilities at a few friendly Third World ports like Conakry in Guinea and Cienfuegos in Cuba, nowhere does it have access to foreign full-service installations.¹⁰¹

The Soviets have demonstrated the capabilities of their naval forces in two large exercises. In April and May 1970, the USSR conducted its first global naval exercises - the OKEAN maneuvers. OKEAN II in April 1975 was larger and more impressive as the Soviets demonstrated their ability to carry out sustained naval operations far from the Soviet land mass.¹⁰² The question remains, of course, whether the OKEAN maneuvers are indicative of how the Soviets plan to employ their naval forces in the future.

¹⁰⁰Scott, "The USSR's Growing Global Mobility," p. 58.

¹⁰¹Klare, "Superpower Rivalry at Sea," pp. 161-163.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 88.

The Soviet Air Force consists of three major components: Frontal Aviation, Military Transport Aviation and Long Range Aviation. Long Range Aviation consists of bomber aircraft whose mission it would be during wartime to strike deep in the enemy's rear. The most recent addition to Long Range Aviation is the supersonic BACKFIRE bomber. The aircraft has become an issue in the SALT negotiations as to whether it is an inter-continental bomber or not. The most impressive improvements, however, have taken place in the other two components of the Air Force.

Since the late 1960's the Soviets' Frontal Aviation (tactical aviation) forces have increased in both numbers and quality. Traditionally, the Soviets have emphasized air defense in their tactical air force. However, since the mid 1960's the Soviets have worked at providing the tactical air force with an improved ground attack capability. New fighter aircraft appeared with improved payload and range for more effective, offensive roles. In 1973, a new generation of fighter aircraft became operational - the SU-17, MIG-23 and SU-19 - possessing even greater range, payload, avionics and electronic counter-measure capabilities which provided the Soviets a multiple mission potential. With these new aircraft, the Soviets are capable of striking targets in most of the NATO countries. To complement the new multi-mission tactical aircraft, the Soviets have introduced improved air-to-air and tactical air-to-surface missiles. The reconnaissance capability of the tactical air force has been substantially improved with the introduction of the Mach 2.8 MIG-25/FOXBAT B.

Since 1973, the Soviets have been deploying the third-generation tactical aircraft into their units in Eastern Europe. All of the new Soviet fighters are believed to have an air-to-ground nuclear capability. In addition, the Soviets have been upgrading the tactical air units of the Warsaw Pact nations.¹⁰³

The airlift capability of Military Transport Aviation has also been improving. Its capability to move cargo to a range of 2,000 nautical miles has increased by fifty percent in the past ten years. While many of the transports are old, the Soviets have introduced new jet transports such as the IL-76. It can airdrop up to three airborne assault vehicles at a range of 3,100 miles. Another new aircraft, the IL-86, capable of carrying up to 350 passengers, flew in December 1976. Together, the IL-76 and IL-86 could eventually provide the Soviets with a global air mobility capability.

The airlift capability of the USSR cannot be measured by the Military Transport Aviation alone. The transport aircraft of the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, are available to support military airlift requirements. For example, in 1976, Cuban troops were airlifted to Angola in Aeroflot IL-62's. Rotation of military personnel to East Germany is carried out each six months by Aeroflot transports. These tasks have been accomplished with no disruption of normal airline schedules. It is estimated that up to 1,200 Aeroflot transports could be diverted to military use.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³Brown, Military Posture, pp. 77-79.

¹⁰⁴Scott, The USSR's Growing Global Mobility, pp. 60-61.

While Soviet improvements in conventional forces have been impressive, it is important to remember that there have been just as dramatic improvements in Soviet strategic forces since 1967. Quantitatively, there has of course been the increase in Soviet ICBM's from 224 to about 1600. Sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) have increased from 29 to 730 or more. Strategic warheads and bombs will have increased greatly due to the introduction of MIRV-ed systems. Qualitatively, four new models of ICBM's and a new generation of ballistic missile submarines have been deployed. In addition, the Soviets have improved the accuracy of their ICBM's. As mentioned earlier, the BACKFIRE bomber has been deployed.¹⁰⁵

U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General David C. Jones expressed dismay at the increased military efforts being carried out by the Soviets during a period of supposedly reduced tensions.

Soviet defense expenditures are the highest in post World War II history, and they continue to sustain a substantial real growth rate. If this priority on military spending were fueled by a serious external threat to Soviet security interests vis-a-vis the U.S., the rapid growth of Soviet forces might be viewed with some equanimity. However, the direction and momentum of Soviet spending are far out of proportion to any rational perception of threat or equilibrium. Not since Germany's rearmament in the 1930's has the world witnessed such a single-minded emphasis on military expansion by a major power.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 57.

USSR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE TRENDS (1966-1976)

(END OF FISCAL YEAR)




Figure 1. Data taken from General George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for 1978, Washington, D.C., 20 January 1977, p. 91.

VI. MILITARY INTERVENTION

Presented thus far has been a historical survey of four phases in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces since World War II. The growth of conventional military forces and the relationship of these forces to an expanding nuclear strategy in Soviet foreign and domestic policy has been presented. To provide a better understanding of the Soviet use of and attitude towards conventional military force during this period, three case studies of use of Soviet conventional forces will be analyzed in detail: Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; and Angola, 1975-1976. Each incident involved the deployment of conventional forces - either conventionally armed or conventional weapons for use by non-Russian troops - to achieve foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union. However, the decision to deploy the forces and the forces available in each incident were different. Three factors will be reviewed in each intervention: (1) the Soviet goals and objectives; (2) the Soviet military force available; and (3) the reaction by both the target country and the West - mainly the U.S.

A. HUNGARY - 1956

1. Background

It might be said the seeds for the 1956 Hungarian Revolution were actually planted after the death of Stalin. Fearing riots in Hungary similar to those in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia on 1 June and in East Berlin on 16 and 17 June 1953,

the Soviets moved to liberalize affairs in Hungary. Imre Nagy was appointed head of the Hungarian government and he announced a major program of reform - the "new Course."¹⁰⁷

In early 1955, Nagy was linked with Georgi Malenkov, the deposed Soviet Politburo member, and was expelled from the Party. He was re-replaced by M. Rakosi but the "New Course" was to haunt the Rakosi regime. After Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February of 1956, the Hungarians followed the example and renounced Rakosi. By July, the Hungarian Central Committee no longer supported Rakosi and the Russians intervened to force his resignation and replaced him with Erno Gerö.¹⁰⁸

The Hungarians were generally not satisfied with the appointment of Gerö. Gerö had the support of the secret police (AVH), the army and the Soviet military forces stationed in Hungary. However, Imre Nagy was still admired and the Nagy faction had both popular and segments of Party support. In fact, several military officers and cadets joined the Nagy supporters.¹⁰⁹

By September of 1956, the Hungarian students took the lead in demanding reforms. By the end of the month, students had

¹⁰⁷D. M. Condit et al, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, 3 Vols., The American University Center for Research in Social Systems (Washington, D.C.: Social Science Research Institute, 1967), Vol. II: "Hungary," The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, by Leonard Bushkoff, pp. 533-535.

¹⁰⁸William H. Fraser, "Comparison of Soviet-Satellite Relations During the Polish October 1956, The Hungarian Revolution 1956, the Czecho-Slovak Intervention 1968," Monograph on Security Affairs (Providence, R.I.: Brown University, 1975), pp. 44-45.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

formed new organizations that were separate from communist youth organizations. In October, Wladyslaw Gomulka came into power in Poland without Soviet military intervention to prevent his National Communists from taking over. This, together with other factors, sparked tensions and emotions in Hungary. Students met in Budapest on 22 October to display support for the Poles and adopted a list of sixteen demands. The demands included withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the return of the government to Nagy, free elections and freedom of speech. Plans were made for a public demonstration the following day.¹¹⁰ The 23 October rally, unbeknownst to the students, was to blossom into a revolution.

The Hungarian Revolution actually involved two separate interventions by Soviet military forces. The first intervention involved only those Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, while the second intervention involved Soviet units from the USSR and Romania. The first use of Soviet military force came about in the early hours of 24 October as Soviet troops entered Budapest. The force was composed of about ten battalions of tank and reconnaissance troops. It is estimated the total force included no more than 6,000 men.¹¹¹ The Soviets insisted the troops were responding to a request for assistance from the Hungarian government.

¹¹⁰ Condit, "Hungary," pp. 576-577.

¹¹¹ John Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution: A Military Post-Mortem," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1958, p. 56.

It has never been definitely determined who asked the Soviets to intervene militarily. There has always been a question as to when a request would have been made, or if a request was made at all. If one considers an elementary problem of time and distance, the Soviets must have been moving toward Budapest late on 23 October before any rioting actually began. A changing Hungarian political situation (Nagy once again became Prime Minister in the early hours of 24 October) added to the confusion. The fact remains that Soviet troops did enter Budapest.¹¹²

For four days Soviet tanks engaged in intermittent fighting with Hungarians in various areas of Budapest. However, the Soviet military refrained from making any real assaults against the insurgents.¹¹³ The fighting did not follow any pattern of established military tactics, although there was gunfire virtually everywhere with large scale damage. The Hungarian Army had fallen apart soon after fighting broke out, and many sided with the insurgents. Soviet tanks and armored cars raced up and down the streets looking for a revolutionary army that did not exist.¹¹⁴

On 27 October, a new Hungarian government was formed with Nagy as Prime Minister and Janos Kadar as Party Secretary.

¹¹²Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 276.

¹¹³Paul E. Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 256.

¹¹⁴Leslie B. Bain, The Reluctant Satellites (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1960), p. 112.

The government was to include several non-communist members. It abolished the AVH as one of its first priorities. The new government announced that the Soviets had agreed to withdraw their forces from Budapest. Thus, the first intervention by Soviet troops ended without restoration of order or annihilation of the Hungarian revolutionaries. Instead, the resistance was strengthened and had produced a genuine revolution.

It was announced that withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest would begin 28 October. However, on the evening of 31 October, reports reached Nagy from eastern Hungary of a substantial Soviet troop buildup. On 1 November, Nagy advised Soviet Ambassador Yuri Andropov that because of a buildup of Soviet troops reported in Hungary, Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact. Additionally, Hungary's neutrality was declared. By late afternoon, Nagy had communicated with the United Nations requesting the four Great Powers defend Hungary's neutrality.¹¹⁵

Andropov suggested that troops entering Hungary were only a relief for Soviet troops that had been fighting. He further suggested that talks be carried out with Soviet military representatives to discuss the necessary details for troop withdrawal. However, on the night of 3 November, the Hungarian military delegation involved in the talks was arrested and at about 0300 hours the next morning, 4 November, the Russians began a second armed intervention in Hungary. Attacking in

¹¹⁵"The Report on Hungary," United Nations Review, August 1957, pp. 7-8.

strength, the Soviets gained all major objectives by 0800 hours.¹¹⁶ Using massive superiority in numbers and firepower, the Soviets obviously wanted to suppress all resistance quickly and absolutely.

2. Soviet Goals and Objectives

In 1953, the Soviets used troops in East Berlin to suppress an uprising by East German workers demonstrating against economic policies in that country. In October of 1956, the Soviets apparently initially perceived the student unrest in Hungary as an uprising of demonstrators similar to that in East Berlin which could be put down with Soviet troops stationed in the country. The Kremlin leaders did not realize they were witnessing a national revolution and an uprising even supported by the segments of the Communist Party elite of Hungary. Unlike East Berlin in 1953, the Soviets encountered unexpected resistance when Soviet units entered Budapest early on 24 Oct. The intervention was indecisive as the Soviet military commanders in Hungary apparently had no specific guidance or directives to deal with the situation they encountered. The reasons for that include not only Soviet concern for the immediate affairs in Hungary, but also concern for broad foreign and domestic policy goals and objectives. These other concerns could and would be influenced by whatever action was ultimately taken in Hungary.

¹¹⁶Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution," p. 10.

Earlier in October, the Soviet Politburo had shown grave concern over political affairs in Poland. The Poles had basically wanted to determine their own domestic policies and put in their "own man," Gomulka, as head of the Party. The Soviets were concerned with the possibility of a trend spreading across Eastern Europe with a resultant loss of control by the Soviets over the individual communist parties. Indirect pressure and threats were used to convince the Poles of their "mistake." Yet, after Khrushchev and three other important Soviet leaders visited Poland on 19 October, the Poles were allowed to carry on with their plans for national communism. Apparently Khrushchev was assured that the Polish leaders were in complete control and Poland was neither to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact nor to establish a pluralistic regime.¹¹⁷ That was the situation in Eastern Europe as the Hungarian unrest exploded.

Soviet control of Eastern Europe was at a crossroads. The Soviet Politburo met in full session in an attempt to find a solution to the problems in the socialist bloc. Not only did Hungary form an important geographic link in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, but the loss of Hungary from the socialist bloc would have been a setback to the Russians' hopes of preserving the monolith of world socialism. The Soviets were appraised of growing unrest in other East European countries: Romanian

¹¹⁷Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 260-261.

and Czechoslovak leaders sent worried messages to Moscow warning of imminent uprisings by the Hungarian minorities in their countries, while East German leader Walter Ulbricht warned of possible outbreaks similar to the 1953 uprisings. If problems were not bad enough, the Chinese Communists irritated Khrushchev by giving him advice. Mao Tse Tung sent a message asking the Soviet Politburo for quick action "to smash the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary."¹¹⁸ Yugoslavia's Tito termed events in Hungary as essentially an anti-Stalinist reaction and said intervention against the Hungarians would harm Soviet interests elsewhere. Thus, the Soviet leaders had to debate the question: Is the Hungarian counter-revolution directed against communism and the Soviet Union, or is it basically akin to the recent changeover in Poland?¹¹⁹

The Soviets had to consider what the effects would be if they were to carry out a large scale intervention after it was obvious the initial intervention was a failure. In their book, Political Power: USA/USSR, Brzezinski and Huntington relate the Soviet situation as follows:

...an armed intervention would be certain to provide much resentment in Eastern Europe and could perhaps set off a new explosion in Poland; it would certainly worsen Soviet relations with Tito, only very recently and with much difficulty improved; it would be an implied admission that the pace of de-Stalinization had been too rapid, and this in turn would certainly affect the prestige and power of Khrushchev; finally, it could even precipitate a clash with the United States....On the other hand, non-intervention

¹¹⁸ Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 12.

¹¹⁹ Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, pp. 374-375.

might result in the spreading of the revolt to the neighboring communist countries and endanger the entire structure of Soviet power in the region; it would be a sign of Soviet impotence....domestically, in the Soviet Union, revisionist tendencies might be encouraged....¹²⁰

While the Politburo debated the effects of possible intervention, Mikoyan and Suslov were sent to Budapest on 30 October to view Hungarian affairs first hand. They found the Hungarian Communist Party had almost completely collapsed. They also found the Hungarians had formed a coalition government with a multi-party system. Mikoyan and Suslov warned the new government it must not allow the return of the old prewar capitalist regime nor could it become an anti-Soviet base.

On the very day Mikoyan and Suslov left Moscow for Budapest, the USSR issued a declaration concerning "developing and further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and other socialist states." Besides being a form of subtle pressure on the Hungarians, it was also intended to make the Western powers believe the Soviets had honorable intentions with respect to Hungary.¹²¹

Unfortunately, the Hungarians did not get the impression the Soviets had honorable intentions. When Soviet military units continued to move into Hungary on 1 November, Nagy summoned Andropov to his office and announced Hungary's neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. That must have been the point where a definite decision had to be made by the

¹²⁰Ibid., pp. 375-376.

¹²¹Radvany, Hungary and the Superpowers, p. 13.

Soviet Politboro. The Hungarians had taken the most drastic actions in the eyes of the Russians and only a strong and rapid intervention by the Russians could end the entire affair.

3. Soviet Military Forces Available

The Soviet military forces in Hungary in early October of 1956 consisted of two divisions: the 2nd and 17th Mechanized Divisions. The two divisions consisted of about twenty thousand men and six hundred tanks and armored cars. The Soviets did not have enough men and equipment to control the country but were used instead to support the Hungarian communist government as an absolutely reliable military force. (The Hungarian armed forces were considered of questionable value if they were needed to quell internal disorder.) The 2nd Mechanized Division was stationed at Cegled, 51 miles southeast of Budapest, while the 17th Mechanized Division was stationed at Szekesfehervar, 41 miles southwest of Budapest.¹²²

There is evidence to indicate the Soviets were making plans to use military force in Hungary even before the events of 23 October. On 20 and 21 October, floating bridges were assembled on the Hungarian-Soviet frontier. Soviet military units in Romania recalled their officers from leave and Hungarian-speaking reserve officers were called to duty. Soviet forces in western Hungary were seen moving in the direction of Budapest.¹²³

¹²²Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution," p. 53.

¹²³"The Report on Hungary," p. 7.

The Soviet forces readily available prior to the first intervention included approximately four divisions in addition to the two divisions stationed in Hungary. They consisted of two divisions in western Romania (the 32nd and 34th Mechanized Divisions) and two divisions in the southwestern corner of the Soviet Ukraine. All of these units were capable of moving into Hungary if the need arose.¹²⁴

On 27 October, elements of the 32nd and 34th Divisions from Romania passed through Budapest on a planned move to western Hungary. Some observers believed the Soviets were carrying out a new offensive as part of their initial intervention. However, the units entered Budapest only to cross the Danube River on the best available bridges. Movement of those units were obviously part of a proposed plan.¹²⁵

Additional forces entered Hungary on 31 October. The Soviet troops occupied Hungarian airfields on 1 and 2 November which virtually eliminated future activity by the Hungarian Air Force.¹²⁶ The intervention carried out on 4 November involved about eleven Soviet divisions - nine infantry and two mechanized divisions. There was also part of a Tactical Air Army supporting the operation. In all, there were about 120,000 men with about 2,500 armored vehicles.¹²⁷

¹²⁴Gellner, "The Hungarian Revolution," p. 54.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 55.

¹²⁶"The Report on Hungary," p. 10.

¹²⁷Geller, "The Hungarian Revolution," p. 54.

In summary, the Soviet forces available in Hungary increased in size and strength throughout the entire period of activity from late October through the second intervention on 4 November. The Soviet leaders used a strong armored force to guarantee success in their second effort. There were to be no mistakes the second time.

4. The Risks of Intervention - Soviet Perceptions of
of Hungarian and U.S. Response

a. Hungarian Response

The Soviet Union was well aware of the capabilities of the Hungarian military forces. In October of 1956, the Hungarian armed forces were in the midst of a major reorganization. Hungary had ten fully organized divisions which included two mechanized divisions and one in the final stages of conversion to a mechanized unit. There were two complete air divisions with a third being formed. Independent units included heavy artillery and antiaircraft brigades and a horse cavalry brigade. An airborne division was at about brigade strength. Total manpower in the Hungarian units was about 250,000 men. Nevertheless, there were some serious weaknesses, particularly in leadership. A recent "troop reduction" had been used to get rid of almost 10,000 junior commanders who had questionable loyalty to the communist regime. That created a shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers in all units.¹²⁸

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 55.

The Hungarian Secret Police (AVH) were an important element in Hungary's domestic affairs. Ten thousand AVH men were stationed in Budapest while an additional 20,000 - 30,000 men were stationed in the provinces. The fact that the AVH was armed made them an important element to consider in any potential outbursts by demonstrators. Generally speaking, the Soviet military could count on the support of AVH forces.¹²⁹

During the initial disturbance in Budapest on 23 and 24 October, it was the AVH that remained loyal to the pro-Soviet wing of the Party. Hungarian army units, responding to requests by government officials to quell the disturbances, generally sided with the demonstrators. The Hungarian Army seemed to melt into the crowds, leaving bands of Freedom Fighters to carry on the harassment of the Soviet troops entering Budapest. When the Hungarians reorganized their government on 28 October, it was realized that control of the army had to be regained. It was decided to combine regular army and police units with various insurgent armed groups into a national guard.¹³⁰ It was to prove a military error as the national guard lacked the leadership and cohesiveness required of a military organization. It was no match for the Soviet force that entered Budapest on 4 November.

The Soviets established their military presence in Hungary four days before the 4 November intervention. By gaining

¹²⁹Condit, "Hungary," p. 58.

¹³⁰Peter I. Gosztony, "General Maleter: A Memoir," Problems in Communism, March-April 1966, p. 58.

control of airfields and strategic locations, they were able to minimize, if not eliminate, any organized Hungarian military response. While the Soviets could guarantee the military aspects of the intervention, they were not so sure of what the reactions of the Western world would be.

b. The Soviet Perception of U.S. Response

The Soviet perception of the U.S. response to affairs in Eastern Europe actually began to develop during the events in Poland in early October. While there was a general fear that the Soviets might intervene militarily in Poland, there were some people who felt the U.S. might show some support for the Poles. However, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles appeared on television's "Face the Nation" on 21 October and indicated two important U.S. policy points: the U.S. did not intend to intervene and there would be no need for intervention.

There were certain key questions and associated answers that were applicable to anywhere in Eastern Europe - even in Hungary later in the month.

Question: "In the event of a blood bath against the Polish people, what will the United States do?"

Dulles: "...There could be some repression, but when you have a whole people rising up, it's unlikely, I think, that efforts will be made to put it down by mass military measures. I don't think it would succeed."

"...our contribution...isn't one of actually intervening and meddling, because that kind of thing, that interference from abroad in the affairs of another country, often is counterproductive."

Question: "...is it realistic to suggest that some country might take the matter before the United Nations as a threat to peace?"

Dulles: "...I doubt whether this would be accepted as holding a general threat to world peace, or as a threat which might begin a world war."

Question: "...there were some reports...about the possible movements of Russian troops...from other bordering areas into Poland....would that not be aggression?"

Dulles: "Well, you see, you have got the so-called Warsaw Pact which was pretty much imposed by the Kremlin upon those countries, but in form, it is a mutual security pact and under it these countries gave the Soviets the right to have troops within their country....Technically, they perhaps have the legal right to do that under the Warsaw Pact."

Question: "So that if the Russian troops moved in, you would not feel that there was any cause for immediate alarm?"

Dulles: "Well, that's another matter. It is not a matter which perhaps could be challenged as a violation of international law because they have a treaty which purports, at least, to give them the right. It would be a very serious affair if it happened, and it would certainly be one which we would watch very closely....But, from the standpoint of international law, and violation of treaties, I do not think you could claim it would be a violation of a treaty."

Question: "...the people of East Germany rose against the Communist regime and the Russians were able to...suppress the uprising by means of armed force....Would we sit back again...if that kind of an uprising were to take place in Poland?"

Dulles: "Well, I do not think we would send our Armed Forces into Poland, or into East Germany, under those circumstances; I doubt if it would be a profitable or desirable thing to do. It would be the last thing in the world that these people, who are trying to win their independence, would want. That would precipitate a full-scale war, and the probable results of that would be all these people would be wiped out." ¹³¹

The Soviet leaders probably substituted the word "Hungarian" every time they heard the word "Pole" in the Dulles interview.

¹³¹Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. Larsen, The Eisenhower Administration 1953-1961: A Documentary History, 2 Vols. (New York: Random House, Inc., 1971), pp. 1: 665-669.

Dulles' comments set the tone for future U.S. attitudes with respect to Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, the Soviets were concerned about a U.S. response to a military intervention in Hungary. For several months they had heard the Eisenhower administration discuss the policy of "rolling back the iron curtain." Although it is reported that Khrushchev did not consider the earlier often-stated Dulles plan of assisting East European resistance movements as a real threat, he did take the U.S. nuclear deterrent seriously. Khrushchev reportedly always felt it necessary to explain to the Soviet leadership that the effect of their decision must be weighed against the U.S. nuclear capability. However, President Eisenhower was just as concerned with the possibility that the Soviets would resort to extreme measures to ensure their control in Eastern Europe.¹³² On 26 October, Eisenhower asked his National Security Council for a position paper which emphasized that the Soviets had to be reassured the U.S. would not attempt to make Hungary a military ally.¹³³

The U.S. intentions were communicated to the Russians on three separate occasions. On 27 October, Dulles addressed the Council on World Affairs and said of Eastern

¹³²In his memoirs, President Eisenhower indicated he was concerned about events in Hungary and "put the Defense Department and other security agencies on special alert" on 26 Oct. However, there is no indication of what the alert entailed or the duration. Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 68.

¹³³Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers, p. 11.

Europe: "We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies." The next day, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge spoke to the United Nations Security Council and quoted Dulles' words from the previous day. Lodge expressed hopes the USSR would not misunderstand American intentions with regard to the changing situation in Hungary. On 29 October, Charles Bohlen, the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, was instructed to assure the Kremlin leaders officially that Dulles' remarks reflected the wishes of the President. These statements must have given ample assurance that the U.S. did not plan to get involved in Hungary.¹³⁴ The declarations did not limit U.S. actions in the United Nations.

The situation in the United Nations during the Hungarian crisis is best described as confused. Since there were virtually no communications with the Hungarian government, and changes in that government could not be confirmed, concerned United Nations members could make only feeble attempts at stirring up interest in the world organization. On 27 October, France, Great Britain and the U.S. attempted to get the Security Council to investigate the Hungarian affair. The next day, before the Council was to meet, Hungary's permanent representative at the United Nations, Peter Kos, forwarded a declaration from the Hungarian government protesting "the consideration of any question concerning the domestic affairs of Hungary." A Radio Budapest broadcast actually occurring as the Council met

¹³⁴Ibid., pp. 11-12.

carried a proclamation by Imre Nagy. He announced that the popular uprising was not a counter-revolution. Kos immediately informed the Council that without further instructions from his government he reserved the right to speak on Hungarian affairs at a later date. Without any other speakers, the Council adjourned without taking any action.¹³⁵

The United Nations did concern itself with military activities the very next day - the Suez crisis. The Israelis, French and British became involved in military action on the Sinai Peninsula and the rest of the Western world was divided in its reaction. Unfortunately for the Hungarians, the attention of the United Nations was directed to events in the Middle East during three very crucial days in Hungarian events - 29, 30 and 31 October.¹³⁶ It was not until 1 November when Nagy notified the United Nations of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and declared neutrality that the United Nations again turned to Hungary. Nagy requested that the question of the neutrality of Hungary and the defense of that neutrality be put on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly.

Nagy's request was distributed to the members of the Security Council on the evening of 2 November. The next day was taken up by much debating. It was not until after Soviet troops had already intervened on 4 November that the Security Council began to discuss the Hungarian affair with

¹³⁵Ibid., pp. 9-10.

¹³⁶Ibid., pp. 10-11.

any seriousness. To add insult to injury, the resolution of the Security Council that was drafted too late, but that called for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, was vetoed by the Russians.¹³⁷

There are other factors the Soviets must have considered when assessing possible U.S. responses to a military intervention in Hungary. The U.S. had been involved in a war in Korea that had ended only three years before. The American people would surely not support a move to become involved in another war so soon. Also, October of 1956 was the final month of campaigning before the November Presidential election. Neither candidate could afford to become involved in talk of war. It was not difficult in the open society of the U.S. for the Russians to sense the feelings of the American people.

In summary, the Soviet decision to intervene in Hungary could not really be considered a high risk decision. Politically and ideologically, the Russians were forced to intervene to maintain hegemony in Eastern Europe. They were faced with a situation that could erode their position as hegemon of the socialist world. Additionally, they were under pressure from the leaders of other socialist countries worried about the consequences of a successful Hungarian revolution on the other governments in Eastern Europe. Militarily, Hungary was an important piece in the Warsaw Pact jigsaw puzzle.

¹³⁷Ibid., pp. 12-16.

The Soviets obviously had the military force available, even though they misjudged the amount of force necessary for the first intervention. The first hours of the Hungarian uprising demonstrated the lack of resolve by the Hungarian armed forces. The Soviets were aware of the limited organized military force that could oppose a second intervention.

The concern over the possibility of a Western military response should have been minimal. Acutely aware of the U.S. nuclear forces, the Soviets should have gotten the indications of U.S. intent from "Washingtonology" - the reverse of Kremlinology. Speeches by the U.S. Secretary of State and other government officials stressed the fact that the U.S. did not intend to become militarily involved in Eastern Europe. The United Nations never aggressively considered the Hungarian question until after the Soviets had successfully intervened in Hungary with a strong military force. The Suez crisis distracted the West and took the pressure temporarily off the Russians. All of these factors led the Soviet leaders to the decision to intervene on 4 November. History has recorded their success.

B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 1968

1. Background

The death of Stalin in 1953 did not generally improve the lives of the people in Czechoslovakia. The Czech leaders were old-guard Stalinists who dreaded the idea of any reform.

However, by the early 1960's, nationalist factions became aroused over economic stagnation and social alienation. The people were dissatisfied with the Czech President and Party boss - Antonin Novotny. A coalition of economic reformers and intellectuals united in an attempt to get rid of the pro-Moscow bureaucrats in the Party, government and trade unions. By January of 1968, Novotny was replaced by Alexander Dubček as General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. By mid February, the population viewed the government with hopeful anticipation. They later became excited with talk of political and economic reforms. Dubcek and the reformers began an effort to remove front men associated with the Russians from the Party and the labor unions. Victims of the Stalinist past were rehabilitated. The pro-Soviet elements in the secret police were stripped of their power and informers linked to the KGB were exposed. The possibility for even greater change was evident when Ludvik Svoboda replaced Novotny as President and Dubcek gained control of the Central Committee. The Soviet leaders watched events in Czechoslovakia nervously.

The Soviets displayed their first open disapproval of Prague's new course in early April, 1968. During a visit by Dubcek to Moscow in early May, the Soviet leaders expressed anxiety over events in Czechoslovakia. On 8 May, a meeting of the party leaders of the "hard-core" Warsaw Pact allies (GDR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria) was held in Moscow to discuss the Czech situation.

Quite possibly, the Soviet leaders could not decide on a "solution" to the Czech problem as Kosygin made an unexpected ten-day visit to that country, arriving 17 May. He apparently hoped to use personal diplomacy to alleviate the situation. Concurrent with Kosygin's visit, Marshal Grechko, Soviet Defense Minister, along with a Soviet military delegation, arrived in Prague for a six-day visit with Czech defense officials.¹³⁸

Grechko apparently took a hard-line approach during his visit and is reported to have raised the question of stationing 10,000 - 12,000 "non-Czechoslovak" troops in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs disagreed on the troop issue but did agree to permit Warsaw Pact maneuvers - a command post exercise involving few actual troops - to be held on Czech territory. It was announced Exercise SUMAVA would take place in June.¹³⁹ Czech agreement to the maneuvers was to prove to be a tactical error for it allowed the introduction of Soviet troops into the country.

Exercise SUMAVA became more than a command post exercise. In early June, Soviet units began preparation for the maneuvers and crossed into Czechoslovakia. They brought with them armor and tactical air units as well as support units such as mobile radio stations. The Soviets were followed by

¹³⁸ Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 370.

¹³⁹ J. Erickson, "International and Strategic Indications of the Czechoslovak Reform Movement," in The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, ed. V. V. Kusin (Santa Barbara, CA: American Bibliographical Center-Clio Press, 1973), p. 42.

units from the GDR, Poland and Hungary. Czech officers were informed about nothing as the Soviets took over such major installations as the airfield of Milovice. After the exercise was completed, the troops did not leave Czechoslovakia but rather seemed to "drag their feet" for one reason or another.¹⁴⁰

According to the Czech Defense Minister, thirty-five percent of the force participating in the exercise had departed finally by 10 July. Some sources estimated the number of Soviet troops still in the country as somewhere near 16,000 men. Some of these troops appeared to be leaving on 13 July but movement was halted the next day and the troops remained in Czechoslovakia for the remainder of July. It was a subtle way of applying pressure by the Soviets.¹⁴¹

The Soviets were especially concerned with the Czechoslovak National Assembly's decision on 27 June to abolish censorship. Also, Dubcek rejected a summons to attend a Warsaw Pact meeting in Poland to discuss the Czech situation. On 11 July, Pravda published an article basically attacking the abolishment of censorship but more importantly it pointed out the existence of the same rationale for Soviet intervention that was used in Hungary in 1956. On 15 July, the Soviets - along with the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria - drafted a letter that was really an ultimatum to Dubcek to take care of

140

¹⁴¹Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 373.

the situation in his country or face the consequences.¹⁴² The war of nerves was intensified.

On 10 July, the Soviets announced the alleged discovery of arms caches and secret documents "proving" Americans and West Germans were planning to help subversive elements in Czechoslovakia. On 23 July, the Soviets announced their forces were engaged in extensive maneuvers all along the Western frontiers of the USSR - to include the border with Czechoslovakia. Soon afterwards it was announced East German and Polish troops were participating in the exercises. There were also indications that Soviet forces in the GDR, Poland and Hungary were moving closer to Czechoslovakia. Apparently the Soviet leadership hoped the Czech leadership would crack under the strain.¹⁴³

Dubcek insisted on a meeting with the Soviet Politburo and that it be held on Czech soil at Cierna. At that meeting on 29 July it was apparent that Moscow's pressures had only solidified the Czechoslovak Party behind Dubcek. After a tense four-day meeting at Cierna, the Soviet leadership backed down and ordered withdrawal of their troops from Czechoslovakia. In addition, many of the demands of the 15 July letter were dropped. The crisis appeared to have passed when the Soviet leaders and the four "hard-line" Warsaw Pact members met with the Czechs on 3 August in Bratislava to endorse the truce agreed on at Cierna.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴²Ibid., pp. 373-374.

¹⁴³Ibid., pp. 374-375.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 376-377.

Less than two weeks after the Bratislava meeting, the Soviets began a round of political-military pressures directed against the Dubcek regime. On 11 August, it was announced that another Warsaw Pact exercise had begun immediately after the large-scale logistics exercise ended 10 August. The new exercise was to be along the borders of Czechoslovakia. Several high-ranking Soviet military figures visited Poland and the GDR in connection with the new maneuvers and gave clear indication Moscow was flexing its muscles again.¹⁴⁵

On the night of 20-21 August, troops belonging to the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia over four frontiers. There was no Czechoslovak military resistance as the Czechoslovak Presidium ordered the army not to fight. Instead, the invaders met with non-violent resistance. However, it was only a matter of hours before the Soviet-led force was in complete control of Czechoslovakia.¹⁴⁶ Military intervention in the affairs of another Eastern European nation had been successfully carried out by the Soviets.

2. Soviet Goals and Objectives

Soviet leaders were disturbed over three primary aspects of the liberalization in Czechoslovakia. First, the intellectuals had called for a multi-party system. Second, the end of censorship exposed unfavorable aspects of the Soviet oligarchy. Thirdly, various groups called for a somewhat more independent

¹⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 378-379.

¹⁴⁶Adam Roberts and Philip Windsor, Czechoslovakia 1968, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 115.

foreign policy. However, the Dubcek leadership assured the Soviet leaders that their country was not going to change its basic orientation nor would the Party lose control of the situation.¹⁴⁷ It is now known that the Soviet bureaucracy was divided in their support of the responses advocated by the policymakers and the bureaucratic and pressure groups. It was not just a matter of dealing with Czechoslovakia; it was a matter of what impact the actions taken with respect to Czechoslovakia would have on other domestic and foreign policy matters.

In February of 1968, the Soviet foreign policy experts carried out extensive reviews of the possible effects of the situation in Czechoslovakia on European political and security matters. Two possible scenarios were considered. First, if Czechoslovakia were to be invaded, relations with Western Europe would be seriously affected, which in turn would increase those nations' interest in NATO and cooperation with the U.S. on security matters. The second scenario "allowed" the Prague Spring to run its course with the Dubcek regime falling into line behind the Soviet leadership. However, the second scenario was considered unrealistic as the experts believed Dubcek would eventually attempt to realign his country with possibly Romania and Yugoslavia or the West. The stability of Eastern Europe would be at stake.¹⁴⁸ It appeared to some policy-makers that there was no alternative to a military intervention.

¹⁴⁷ Alvin B. Rubenstein, "Czechoslovakia in Transition," Current History, April 1969, pp. 206-207.

¹⁴⁸ Kenneth A. Myers and Dimitri Simes, Soviet Decision Making, Strategic Policy, and SALT (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, 1974), pp. 43-44.

There were several reasons why an intervention was advocated. The most basic, of course, was the requirement to forestall "serious damage to Soviet political, economic and interests in Eastern Europe." It was feared events in Czechoslovakia would jeopardize relations with Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets saw indications that some of their fears were being realized as Romania and Yugoslavia gave the new Czechoslovak leadership open diplomatic and political backing. Tito and Romania's Ceausescu signed a joint communique on 1 June condemning "the pressures, threats and interferences in the affairs of other states" and stressed "the exclusive right of each Party to independently fashion its policy in building socialism in its country."¹⁴⁹ The Soviets viewed such statements as a potential threat to their control in other areas of the socialist bloc. It was even feared by some Soviet Politburo members that the non-Russian republics of the Ukraine and Latvia were too exposed to their liberal Czechoslovak neighbors and would be encouraged to strive for national communism.¹⁵⁰

Apparently undecided whether to intervene militarily or not, the Soviet Politburo tried a mixture of diplomacy and threat of military force. By the end of July, neither approach had apparently "hampered" the Dubcek regime. Aware that Dubcek

¹⁴⁹Zdenek Suda, The Czechoslovak Republic (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 132.

¹⁵⁰Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decisionmaking and the 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis," Studies in Comparative Communism, Spring/Summer 1975, pp. 156-157.

was supported not only by Yugoslavia and Romania but also the majority of the non-ruling Western European Communist parties, the Soviet Politburo agreed to travel to Cierna in Czechoslovakia for discussions with the Dubcek government. Such a trip by the Soviet Politburo was unprecedented and reflected the seriousness of the event.¹⁵¹ The Cierna meeting appeared to produce a temporary solution acceptable to all parties concerned. A "local" solution was sure to eliminate any potential interference by the West in Eastern European affairs.

Not only did the Soviets not want the U.S. and other Western powers to become involved in Eastern Europe, they also did not want to jeopardize relations with the U.S. Though showing little interest in strategic arms limitations discussions in 1962, the Soviets saw advantages in improving their relations with the U.S. in 1968. Several factors had changed the attitudes of the Soviet leadership: Western Europe had refused to consider a European security conference without full American and Canadian participation; relations with the Peoples' Republic of China continued to deteriorate while the Soviets worried about the traditional nightmare of a two-front threat by China and NATO; and just as the Soviets hoped to surpass the U.S. in total number of ICBM's, the U.S. developed its first ABM - SENTINEL.¹⁵² However, as was the case in Hungary in 1956, the Soviet leaders' first priority was insuring Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe.

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 168.

¹⁵²Myers and Simes, Soviet Decision Making, Strategic, and SALT, pp. 43-44.

Events in August of 1968 demonstrated to the Soviets that their diplomatic efforts were not going to control the Dubcek regime the way the Soviet Politburo wanted that regime controlled. Following the Cierna and Bratislava talks, both Tito and Ceasescu visited Prague. The response by the Czechoslovak public was overwhelming, particularly for Tito. Possibly the Soviets saw the roots for a future Communist Little Entente. Another event that worried the Soviets took place on 15 August. It was the meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the formal constitution of the Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia. The meeting worried the Soviets because it was an example of what could be expected at the Fourteenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Party set to meet on 9 September. The Congress could eliminate the formerly legal basis for intervention.¹⁵³

On 19 August a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee took place in Moscow and it is possible that at that time the decision was made to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia. Several hours later, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin informed American officials that Kosygin was ready to meet with President Johnson on 30 September for a summit meeting. It was obviously an attempt by the Russians to give the impression that events in Czechoslovakia had no effect on U.S.-Soviet relations.¹⁵⁴ The Soviets tried to tell the world that the USSR acted with

¹⁵³Suda, The Czechoslovak Republic, p. 141.

¹⁵⁴Myers and Simes, Soviet Decision Making, Strategic, and SALT, p. 46.

other "fraternal socialist countries" to satisfy "a request by Party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic for immediate assistance, including assistance with armed forces."¹⁵⁵ Unfortunately, the Soviets did not find sufficient leadership in Czechoslovakia to form a new government which would "approve" a "Soviet-assisted" regime.

3. Soviet Military Forces Available

Except for briefly after World War II, Soviet troops had never been stationed on Czechoslovak soil. It seems unusual the Soviets did not leave troops in the country since Czechoslovakia borders on the Federal Republic of Germany. If Czechoslovakia had ever withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact, it would have had a radical effect on the strategic situation in Central Europe by opening a possible corridor for NATO forces directly into the side of the USSR. However, the Czechoslovak government had several times declared their unwillingness to allow permanent stationing of foreign troops on Czechoslovak soil.¹⁵⁶

The Soviets maintained a strong military presence in East Germany, Poland and Hungary. (Soviet troops withdrew from Romania in June of 1968.) The 26 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe were maintained at or near combat-strength; 13 of the divisions were tank divisions. It was estimated that that the 26 divisions could be increased to 70 within a month.

¹⁵⁵Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 381.

¹⁵⁶Stephen S. Anderson, "East Europe: The Politics of Recovery," Current History, October 1969, p. 208.

In addition to the Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, the Soviets had 63 divisions in the European USSR (west of the Ural Mountains and north of the Caucasus). The 63 divisions were also combat-ready units.

There was at least one Soviet tactical air army in East Germany with about 900 tactical aircraft. The Soviet tactical air forces still contained a significant proportion of obsolescent aircraft of early and mid-1950 vintage. There were additional fighter aircraft stationed at bases in the USSR. The Air Transport Force of the Soviet air forces was equipped with about 1,500 short and medium range transports and a few heavy transports were in service.¹⁵⁷

Since the intervention in Czechoslovakia involved military units from other Warsaw Pact members, a review of their force is provided. The East German Army had about 85,000 men organized into six divisions. Hungary's army had a strength of 95,000 men organized into six divisions. Poland had the largest army of the four, consisting of 185,000 men in 15 divisions. Bulgaria had 125,000 men forming 12 divisions in their army.¹⁵⁸ Not all their forces participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

On the night of 20-21 August, troops from the USSR and its four Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia. The invading force was initially made up of almost 200,000 men. Fourteen Soviet divisions were supported by six divisions from the

¹⁵⁷The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1968-1969 (London: ISS, 1968), pp. 1-9.

¹⁵⁸Ibid.

other countries. (Unconfirmed estimates indicated the following composition of the East European forces involved: roughly 20,000 East Germans; roughly 20,000 Hungarians; 50,000 Poles; and about 10,000 Bulgarians.)¹⁵⁹ About six of the Soviet divisions came from East Germany with the remaining eight probably from Poland, the Ukraine and Hungary.¹⁶⁰ It has been said that the occupation of Czechoslovakia was one of the best executed military operations in recent history.

There were several significant observations concerning the conduct of the entire "Czechoslovak affair." In early August, General S. M. Shtmenko, Stalin's wartime Chief of Operations, was recalled from an administrative post to replace the aging Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces. Shtmenko was to be in charge of the invasion under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, General I. G. Pavlovsky. Interestingly enough, once deployment of all the military units participating in Exercise SUMAVA was complete and the troops were in position for maneuvers, command was transferred from the regular Warsaw Pact headquarters to the Soviet High Command.¹⁶¹ It was an indication of the importance Soviet leaders placed on the activities. (It may also provide an indication of how the Soviets could carry out future military

¹⁵⁹Roberts and Windsor, Czechoslovakia 1968, p. 108.

¹⁶⁰R. Rockingham Gill, "Europe's Military Balance After Czechoslovakia," Military Review, January 1969, pp. 47-48.

¹⁶¹Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy," Problems of Communism, September-October 1973, pp. 7-8.

operations in which NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries might be involved.)

As the invasion began, U.S. Air Force radars in Western Europe observed a stream of aircraft moving from Leningrad to Prague. The stream was the airlift of an entire division - men, armored vehicles, fuel and supplies - carried out by 250 Soviet transports. It was the biggest known airlift up to that time. Air fields had been secured by the first units entering Czechoslovakia so as to eliminate any potential resistance.¹⁶²

It is possible the Soviets might have anticipated some Czechoslovak resistance. White stripes were painted along the top of each invading vehicle so that Soviet fighter aircraft could identify the "healthy forces." Also, the Soviets had a large amount of bridging equipment, suggesting they expected possible sabotage such as destruction of primary bridges. Armed resistance was not a problem, however.¹⁶³

There was a major problem, however. The prepared intervention of Czechoslovakia posed significant technical logistics problems. John Erickson has pointed out in his studies that "the key to the invasion...was logistics, rather than battle troops or anything else."¹⁶⁴ The Soviets spent much time and effort preparing the military buildup. Not only were regular units involved in the several exercises conducted prior to the

¹⁶²Phillip A. Karber, "Czechoslovakia - A Scenario of the Future?" Military Review, February 1969, p. 12.

¹⁶³Roberts and Windsor, Czechoslovakia 1968, p. 110.

¹⁶⁴Erickson in The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968, p. 62.

invasion, but also thousands of recruits were called up and thousands of items of motor transport and other equipment were mobilized for a big logistics exercise announced on 23 July. The rear services participated in a maneuvers stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. The significance is seen when it is understood that the rear-services exercise was carried out during midsummer, disrupting the collectives' harvests.¹⁶⁵ If the Kremlin leaders had not decided to invade Czechoslovakia, Western analysts could never explain the Soviet military actions during the entire summer of 1968. It is quite possible the cost of "being prepared" was one of the primary factors in the decision to invade.

There is one other interesting point involving possible "time and cost." Under the 1967 Soviet Universal Military Obligation Law, the following length of reserve obligation for enlisted men and warranted officers applied in 1968:¹⁶⁶

<u>Class I</u> (through 34 yrs)	<u>Class II</u> (35-44 years)	<u>Class III</u> (45-49 years)
4-6 call-ups of 3 months each	1-2 call-ups of 2 months each	1 call-up of 1 month

It is possible that either many Class I reservists were completing their three-month call-up and the Soviet leaders were concerned about the cost of replacing them with other reservists or the Soviet leadership had already called the Class II

¹⁶⁵James H. Polk, "Reflections on the Czechoslovakian Invasion, 1968," Strategic Review, Winter 1977, p. 32.

¹⁶⁶David A. Smith, "Soviet Military Manpower," Air Force Magazine, March 1977. p. 81.

reservists and only had them for two months before the "old men" were called. Whatever the case was, the Soviets had assembled a force large enough to handle the invasion.

The invasion force was estimated at about 200,000 troops on 21 August. By 28 August, estimates of foreign troops in Czechoslovakia ran as high as 650,000 to 700,000.¹⁶⁷ With a force that large, the Soviets were assured of success.

4. The Risks of Intervention - Soviet Perceptions of of Czechoslovak and U.S. Response

a. Czechoslovak Response

In 1968 it was said the military forces of Czechoslovakia on paper formed an important element of the Warsaw Pact. With a population of 14-1/2 million people, the nation maintained a quarter of a million men under arms in one type of organization or another. There were about 175,000 men in the army, 50,000 men in the air force, plus an additional 40,000 men in para-military organizations such as frontier guards.

The Czechoslovak Army was made up of five armored divisions and nine motor-rifle divisions (including an airborne brigade). The divisions were supported by 2,700 tanks. The Air Force inventory included 600 tactical aircraft - half for an interceptor role and half for a ground attack role. There was a small helicopter force and air transport force. Next to the Soviet Union itself, Czechoslovakia was probably the best equipped military force in the Warsaw Pact.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷Roberts and Windsor, Czechoslovakia 1968, p. 107.

¹⁶⁸Erickson in The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968, p. 33.

The Soviets must have been a bit wary of the Czechoslovak armed forces, as invading units did take some precautions as was indicated above. Additionally, the Soviets had lowered the Czechoslovak's fuel and ammunition stocks by transferring those supplies to East Germany for more "exercises."¹⁶⁹ Soviet intelligence must have observed that the Czechoslovak armed forces were not deployed, and could not be redeployed for operations designed to resist an invasion from the east. The Czechoslovak military intelligence was concerned with the west and not with the intentions of their allies (?) to the east.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak leadership ordered the Czechoslovak Army not to fight.

Maybe the Soviets hoped the Czechoslovak military would take up positions against an attack from the east. Then the Soviets would have had an excuse to destroy the "threat" and gain control of the country even earlier than it did. However, Dubcek kept reassuring the Soviets that he was in complete control. He knew the consequences if he allowed an appearance of military action being taken by his government.

b. Response by Western Powers

To understand what the anticipated Western responses would be to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR, it is necessary to understand what an invasion of that country would have created for the Western world. The main factor is that

¹⁶⁹Roberts and Windsor, Czechoslovakia 1968, p. 110.

¹⁷⁰Erickson in The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968, p. 47.

the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and even the large scale exercises conducted during the summer of 1968, did not really affect the balance of power in Europe. It did affect the power structure, or disposition of forces in Europe, and that was a concern for Western defense planners.

General Polk, Commander of the U.S. Army in Europe during the Czechoslovak crisis, recently indicated that no precautionary instructions had been issued to the military commanders in Europe by either the U.S. or NATO chains of command. Standing instructions had been issued as early as July instructing commanders not to become involved in the internal political struggles of Czechoslovakia by allowing increased patrolling and activities near the Czechoslovak border. In other words, the military was to avoid any sort of incident. When the Soviet invasion did take place in August, most of the NATO defense ministers and their staffs were scattered across Europe on their annual August holiday.¹⁷¹ Surely the Soviet intelligence agents were aware of all those facts.

As mentioned earlier, the Soviets were concerned that the intervention in Czechoslovakia would strengthen NATO by driving independent-minded Europeans back into the arms of the U.S. Some Soviet analysts feared the invasion would have an effect on the U.S. Presidential campaign and aid the Nixon campaign.¹⁷² Yet, it really appears the Soviets might not

¹⁷¹Polk, "Reflections," p. 31.

¹⁷²Myers and Simes, Soviet Decision Making, Strategic Policy, SALT, p. 47.

have expected much of a reaction from the West at all. It was an internal matter for the socialist bloc and the Soviets were going to solve it - without Western help.

In summary, the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia could not really be considered a high risk decision. Politically, the Soviets felt it was absolutely necessary to put an end to Dubcek's liberalism. Not only did it challenge the control of the Soviets in Eastern Europe but also had the potential to affect the balance of power. The loss of Czechoslovakia to the socialist bloc would create grave problems for the defense of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact members.

The Soviets obviously took a lesson from the intervention in Hungary in 1956. They were determined to have a force strong enough to achieve their goal on the "first attempt." By including units from other Warsaw Pact nations in the invasion force, the Soviets were able to give the appearance of both legality and togetherness in solving a problem in the affairs of the entire socialist bloc. Once the decision was made to intervene, the Soviets achieved their goal militarily in a matter of hours.

The impact of world opinion and the possibility of a Western reaction was not really a problem in 1968. By that time the USSR had become an acknowledged nuclear power and they were not intimidated as easily as they were in the 1950's. The U.S. and other major powers were more willing to allow the USSR to take care of its own problems.

C. ANGOLA - 1975-1976

1. Background

History has recorded Portugal's presence in Africa for almost 500 years. Yet it was not until 1961 that fighting erupted in Angola against colonial rule. This early fighting evolved from a widespread revolt of the Bakongo people inspired, but haphazardly prepared, in Zaire (Congo). Following Portuguese retaliation, warfare slowly developed in the northern part of Angola. The leader of the rebels, Holden Roberto, formed the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) whose support remained centered mainly among the Bokongo people who made up twenty percent of the nearly six million Africans in Angola.¹⁷³

Angola, unfortunately, suffered from a three-way rivalry. In the mid-1950's, another movement - the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) - began and was associated with Angolan and Portuguese Communists. The support for the MPLA came from the intellectuals, the African slum dwellers around the capital city, Luanda, and from the Mbundu people - a people constituting twenty-five percent of the population and living in the region east of Luanda. While the MPLA did participate in revolts in 1961, it was eventually weakened by factionalism and other setbacks. By 1966, the MPLA leader, Agosteno Neto, was able to gather enough support to launch insurgency campaigns in northern and eastern Angola with some degree of success.

¹⁷³Thomas H. Henriksen, "Angola and Mozambique: Intervention and Revolution," Current History, November 1976, p. 153.

A third nationalist movement was formed in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi following personality and ethnic disagreements within the FNLA. The new movement, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was based among the largest ethno-linguistic group (forty percent of the Angolan population); however, it did not have access to any neighboring state for supplies and training areas. As a result, its military capabilities did not match its popularity.¹⁷⁴

While it is true that the three insurgent groups were separated due to their ethnic differences, the history of their survival also had an effect on relations with one another. During the 1950's, prior to the outbreak of insurgent activity in 1961, the Portuguese authorities attempted to eliminate individuals suspected of nationalistic sympathies. The movements suffered from limited leadership as well as travel restrictions, police harassment and lack of funds. Thus, their range of action and "political vision" were limited. They remained parochial and were unable to escape their ties of ethnic and regional loyalties. Forced to operate clandestinely, the insurgents were distrustful of one another.¹⁷⁵

In April 1974, a military coup in Portugal overthrew that government. That was the spark that ignited the increased struggle for independence in Angola. By late 1974, the new Portuguese government saw its authority in Angola slip away as

¹⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 153-154.

¹⁷⁵John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs, April 1976, p. 409.

the three Angolan insurgent movements - accorded political legitimacy by the Portuguese - fought for political and military power. With the collapse of Portuguese authority in Angola, there were obvious enticements to outside intervention.

Outside support of the three insurgent movements did not begin only after the coup in Portugal. Each of the movements had been receiving outside assistance, sometimes from more than one source, for several years. It was this pre-coup assistance that set the stage for the fighting in Angola in 1975 and 1976. The Soviet Union had furnished limited support to the MPLA from the 1960's to 1973. They supported the MPLA for three reasons: first, because the MPLA leaders had expressed the most radical form of socialism; second, because the Portuguese Communist Party had shown active support for the MPLA; and third, because the posture of the FNLA was so anti-communist.¹⁷⁶ However, in 1973 the Soviets sharply reduced their assistance when it appeared the movement would not be successful due to internal squabbles. The MPLA had also received limited support from Cuba from as early as 1965.

The FNLA, although avowedly non-socialist, on the other hand, received material support from the Chinese beginning in 1973. The support included a 120-man training mission headed by a Chinese major-general. Able to use Zaire as a refuge, the FNLA worked toward developing a material superiority while lacking in political strength. UNITA also received aid from

¹⁷⁶F. Stephen Larrabee, "Moscow and Angola," Radio Liberty Special Report, RL 490/75, 26 November 1975, p. 4.

China, but it involved only a very small amount of training, financial support and publicity.¹⁷⁷

In mid-1974, following the coup in Portugal, FNLA received tons of arms from China, as well as instructors. With Chinese help, the FNLA was able to achieve military primacy among the three insurgent movements. It was ironic that China would support a non-socialist movement, yet it appears that the Chinese wanted to acquire influence in East Africa as well as to embarrass the Soviets who had supported the MPLA.

By the end of 1974 - October or November - the Soviets renewed modest arms shipments to the MPLA. The USSR was obviously concerned that China would have an opportunity for political and ideological gain in Africa.¹⁷⁸ The Soviets could see the possibility for civil war growing in Angola.

In an effort to avoid a full-scale civil war in Angola, the Portuguese government flew the leaders of the three insurgent movements to Alvor in southern Portugal in January 1975 for a meeting. An accord - the Alvor Accord - was signed by the three leaders and representatives of the Portuguese government which set a date for independence in Angola - 11 November 1975. (At the time of the meeting in Portugal, the U.S. covertly gave the FNLA a grant of \$300,000)¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," pp. 410-411.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., p. 413.

¹⁷⁹Henriksen, "Angola and Mozambique: Intervention and Revolution," p. 154.

It was hoped the Alvor Accord would bring about a relaxation in tensions and an end to fighting. However, just the opposite happened. Fighting broke out almost immediately. In addition, Soviet deliveries of arms and supplies were intensified. In fact, the amount of Soviet aid changed the entire complexion of the conflict in Angola. The weapons which the Soviets provided the MPLA included:

...various light and heavy machine guns; submachine guns; grenades; AK-47 rifles; Kalashnikov assault rifles; Simonov semi-automatic carbines; 12mm mortars; 24mm and 75 mm recoilless rifles; 75mm, 82mm, 107mm recoilless guns; Katyushin rockets; 37mm, 14.5mm antiaircraft machine guns; 107mm and 122mm ground-to-ground rockets; T-34 and T-54 tanks; new PT-76 amphibious tanks; armored cars; personnel carriers; 108mm recoilless antitank guns; antivehicle and antitank mines; helicopter gunships; MIG-21's; and hand-held SAM-7 antiaircraft missiles.¹⁸⁰

At least six shiploads of military equipment for the MPLA arrived from Cuba early in 1975. Additionally, thirty-eight flights of Soviet AN-22 transport aircraft flew to Luanda - Angola's capital - following stopovers in Guinea. Four Russian ships, as well as Bulgarian ships and a Yugoslav ship, arrived at Luanda with arms. It was reported that 600 tons of military equipment were seen in Tanzania awaiting movement to MPLA forces.¹⁸¹

The supply of arms to the MPLA continued through the spring. However, a new problem came to light - the MPLA insurgents did not know how to use the sophisticated weapons supplied them. In June, the first Cuban advisors - 230 strong -

¹⁸⁰Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications," Strategic Review, Summer 1976, p. 93.

¹⁸¹Ibid., p. 93.

arrived in Angola to establish MPLA training camps.¹⁸² By September, two months before the proposed independence date of November 11, the military aid provided by the Russians and Cubans was enough to guarantee the MPLA military supremacy.

In mid-August, the leftist government in Portugal was on the verge of collapse and began to move away from the communists. Cuba reacted quickly and put together a military force to send to Angola. Three Cuban troop ships arrived in eastern Africa in late September and early October.

Other "outside" troops entered Angola in August when South Africans crossed into that country, apparently to protect the hydroelectric projects on the Cumene River. However, in late October the South Africans sent an armored column into Angola in support of a UNITA-FLNA alliance. The column advanced rapidly and in early December mauled the Cuban forces it encountered.

The appearance of a South African armored column set off the next stage of the Cuban buildup. Four or five Cuban ships left Cuba in late October and a troop airlift began on November 7. Cuban defeats by the armored force brought an influx of new Cuban soldiers to Angola, estimated at 400 per week to about 1,000 per week in January.¹⁸³

South Africa's assistance backfired for the UNITA-FLNA alliance. The censure of the Soviet-Cuban intervention by

¹⁸²William J. Durch, "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper No. 201, September 1977, pp. 41-42.

¹⁸³Ibid., pp. 46-48.

several African nations never came about because of the emotions that were aroused throughout Africa when the coalition cooperated with the apartheid government of South Africa.¹⁸⁴ South Africa forces withdrew from Angola in late March 1976 as a result of growing domestic pressure, an increase in Cuban numbers and firepower and the ending of U.S. aid to FNLA and UNITA as a result of U.S. Congressional action.

On 11 November 1975, the MPLA announced the creation of the People's Republic of Angola. The USSR and other socialist states gave immediate recognition to the government. Interestingly, the Chinese had withdrawn their personnel from training camps in Zaire in July nominally in response to a call for neutrality among the three rival factions in Angola. Actually, the Chinese could not compete with the massive aid program carried out by the Soviets and Cubans.

The large supply of Soviet weapons and Cuban soldiers - estimated to be 13,500 Cuban regulars in early 1976 - brought about the defeat of the FNLA and the UNITA. By March 1976, the heavy fighting in the Angola war was over. However, fighting did continue as the remnants of the UNITA armed force began a limited guerrilla struggle.¹⁸⁵ While there is little chance the MPLA victory will be reversed, guerrilla activities against the MPLA government have, and will continue to have, a destabilizing effect.

¹⁸⁴Henriksen, "Angola and Mozambique: Intervention and Revolution," p. 155.

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

2. Soviet Goals and Objectives

It would be ridiculous to argue that the USSR needed a socialist government in power in Angola. The fact that a socialist government came to power as a result of Soviet assistance is important to the USSR, but that came about as a result of the Soviets achieving other more important objectives. Soviet objectives in Angola were mainly those of strategic-political nature. Primarily, there were three objectives: weaken the influence of China - and the United States - in Africa; improve the image of the USSR in the Third World; and gain access to the strategically important area of Eastern Africa - both for its strategically important location and its reserves of raw materials.

While the USSR is extremely self-sufficient in vital raw materials, it would prefer to conserve those resources and acquire them elsewhere. In effect, they want to save their capability for self-sufficiency for a time of crisis. Southern Africa could provide the Soviets with access to enormous reserves of raw materials. Just as important to the Soviets is the goal of limiting or eliminating Western access to raw materials in the Third World. The energy crisis in the West has shown the importance of raw materials to national security.¹⁸⁶

The strategic geographical location of Angola is also an important factor that could have an impact on the national security of Western nations. One major objective of the Soviets

¹⁸⁶Vanneman and James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola," p. 95.

is the deepwater shipping facilities at Lobito and Luanda. Both ports would be capable of servicing Soviet Naval and merchant vessels. Excellent submarine facilities could be constructed at Bahia dos Tigres which has an excellent deep-water anchorage. Such facilities could threaten the Cape of Africa oil route, as well as provide a "jumping Off" point for Soviet activities in the South Atlantic towards South America. Besides port facilities, Angola has at least three modern air fields which can easily be enlarged to accommodate long range Soviet aircraft.¹⁸⁷

Since the rift between China and the USSR became publicized in 1960, the Soviets have been forced to devote much of their foreign policy efforts to minimizing and containing Chinese influence, both in the Socialist world and among the emerging nations. Following the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Chinese went to great efforts to ridicule the Soviets for interfering in the affairs of an independent state. As a result, the image of the USSR was tarnished among the Third World nations. China, in the meantime, for several years had been devoting much effort to developing ties with new governments in Africa. When it appeared the Chinese might have the opportunity to emerge from the Angolan affair as supporters of the victorious insurgent faction, the Soviets moved quickly. They wanted not only to defeat the Chinese-backed faction but also to embarrass the

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

Chinese by demonstrating to the African nations that the Chinese were not capable of providing the large amounts of aid that the Soviets could.

The Soviet objectives with regard to the U.S. were very much different than those with respect to China. The Soviets most certainly felt boxed in by the climate of detente between the U.S. and USSR. Angola provided the USSR the opportunity to not only demonstrate its capability to project its foreign policy on a global basis but also demonstrated that detente did not restrict the Soviet Union from supporting "wars of liberation."

The Soviet concern over the effect of detente most certainly had an impact on the decision to support the MPLA in Angola. The Twenty-Fifth Party Congress was scheduled to meet just after the Angolan civil war began. Since it was the first Congress since 1972 and the beginning of detente with the U.S., it is possible that Brezhnev was particularly aware of how the Soviet leadership would perceive the Soviet position on Angola. If he pursued a "hands off" approach, he would have been criticized by those in the Soviet leadership who believed detente inhibited the ability of the USSR to "assist their clients in the Third World."¹⁸⁸ On the other hand, a firm commitment in Angola would have demonstrated to the Soviet leadership as well as the rest of the world that detente would not keep the USSR from pursuing its goal of world socialism.

¹⁸⁸Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Foreign Policy Decisionmaking and Angola, 1975," Studies in Comparative Communism, (forthcoming).

3. Military Forces Available

The Soviets demonstrated during the Angolan Civil War that they were, in fact, a global power. The military force available to them included a navy capable of "blue-water" operations, a strategic airlift capability, and a "storehouse" of modern conventional weapons available for use by the Soviet-supported factions in the Third World. The Soviet intervention in Angola involved an array of modern "Soviet weapons, training, technicians, combat troops, including pilots from the Soviet allies, Algeria and Cuba, an enormous air and sea lift, Cuban assault vessels and unconfirmed reports of Soviet warships firing on anti-Soviet forces."¹⁸⁹

The USSR also demonstrated the capacity to employ a global network of influence to support an operation in a country as isolated as Angola. Ships from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia delivered arms to the African nations. Mozambique sent 250 veteran troops to assist the Soviets. Congo-Brazzaville provided a staging area for two squadrons of Soviet MIG-21's. Transport planes were allowed to refuel at Conakry.¹⁹⁰ Last, but not least, were the Cuban troops which provided the MPLA with a numerically superior force.

When the Cubans provided troops to fight with the MPLA in Angola, it was believed that the Cubans were acting as the mercenaries of the USSR in a war by proxy. The Soviet leadership surely realized the danger of actually putting Soviet

¹⁸⁹Ibid., p. 93.

¹⁹⁰Ibid., p. 95.

combat troops on the ground in Angola. Unlike Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Angola was not geographically "attached" to the USSR nor was Angola a part of the Socialist bloc. The question remains then, "how hard did the Soviets have to push the Cubans" to get them to commit such a large number of troops to the effort in Africa? As indicated earlier, the Cubans had been supporting the MPLA since as early as 1965. In addition, success in emerging nations like Angola could only help Castro's image among the Third World nations. Nevertheless, the point remains that the arms used by the Cubans (and by the MPLA) were supplied by the Soviets.

While the Soviets supposedly never used their own troops on Angolan soil, they took advantage of the opportunity to demonstrate the capability of deploying a small naval force off the coast of Angola. Three ships, including a destroyer, were sent to the vicinity of Angola while a cruiser was deployed off Conakry.¹⁹¹ It is unknown whether the naval force would quickly have evacuated that part of the ocean if a Western naval force would have approached with the possible intent of intervention. The fact remains, the Soviet force was apparently not challenged, with the end result that the African nation saw a visible show of force by the Soviets.

In summary, the Soviets demonstrated in Angola a global capability that had not been observed before. Providing everything needed in the way of modern military supplies and armament,

¹⁹¹Ibid., p. 100.

and relying on Cubans and MPLA forces to carry out the fighting, the Soviets have indicated that the USSR is capable of carrying out military operations below the nuclear level without directly confronting the U.S. As this study is written, the Soviets are involved in similar operations in Ethiopia. The West may well be seeing a new Soviet strategy unfolding which will involve emerging Third World nations acquiring Soviet political and conventional military support. The U.S. may find that it can only involve itself at the risk of escalating military activities in the emerging states to a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

4. The Risks of Intervention - Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Response

The Soviet decisions to support the MPLA in Angola most assuredly was made after weighing the risks involved. In retrospect, there were many indicators which must have given the Soviets the signal that they were not risking a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. In fact, the Soviets "received" such indicators throughout the entire Angolan affair.

In 1974, as the civil war in Angola began to explode, the U.S. was still recovering from the embarrassment of its loss in Vietnam. The government and the public were tired of fighting an unpopular war half-way around the world and did not want the U.S. to become involved in another such conflict. To most Americans, Angola "did not exist."

The U.S. government, in January 1975, apparently took its first real look at events in Angola. At that time the

National Security Council authorized a covert grant to the FNLA of \$300,000. The rumors soon spread that there was "heavy continuing CIA support for the FNLA."¹⁹² In July, in an effort to avoid "a public confrontation" with Congress, the U.S. Administration began a program to beef up the FNLA and UNITA. By the end of the year, more than \$30 million in military hardware had been sent to the two insurgent groups.¹⁹³

By late 1975, the Angola issue came to a head in the U.S. Senate. Informed of the U.S. covert aid provided to Angola earlier in the year, several Senators - in a fit of conscience and with worry over the coming election year - voted to ban further covert aid to Angola. The following month, January 1976, the House of Representatives followed the Senate's example.

To the Soviets, it must have seemed that they perceived virtually no risks in Angola. The U.S. President never tried to use the "hot line" to settle the Angola affair. The U.S. did not even threaten to delay SALT negotiations or stop grain sales to the USSR.¹⁹⁴ More importantly, the U.S. never tried to match - step by step - the amount and quality of aid the Soviets provided the MPLA.

The Soviets achieved a highly symbolic "victory" in their support of the MPLA in Angola. They demonstrated the capability to project their foreign policy beyond their own

¹⁹²Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," p. 414-415.

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 416.

¹⁹⁴Ibid., p. 419.

shores with a global military capability. Additionally, they demonstrated that they can achieve major foreign gains with little risk.

....Angola is an example of a graduated, relatively low cost, carefully orchestrated expansion of Soviet influence; it is a limited military confrontation, a proxy war....It is virtually a new instrument of foreign policy. ¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵Ibid., p. 97.

VII. CONCLUSION

Historically, the Russians have always maintained a large standing army for defense of the Motherland. Consequently, the emphasis was generally on the ground forces, particularly the infantry. However, since World War II and with the advent of the atomic bomb, the Soviet defense establishment has carried out changes in both organization and weapons capabilities through four phases of development. In each of the four phases can be seen changes in the priority of the development of conventional military forces, as well as changes in the attitude of the Soviet leadership toward the importance of conventional military force.

The first post-World War II phase covered the period from the end of the war to Stalin's death in 1953. During that phase, Stalin continued to stress the importance of a strong continental army. The emergence of the U.S. as an atomic power forced the Soviet leadership to put an increased emphasis on acquiring a nuclear weapon capability. However, while the Soviets did explode their first atomic device during this phase, the Soviet military remained a continental force.

The second phase of Soviet military development began in 1953, following the death of Stalin, and continued until early 1960. It was during this period that the Soviets began to acquire nuclear weapons. However, Soviet strategy continued to stress the traditional ground forces while the military

leadership, having followed the strategy set forth by Stalin himself for so many years. slowly began to question the impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy as a whole. Therefore, modern weapons - such as ballistic missiles - were developed for short and medium ranges rather than intercontinental ranges. The Soviets were required to completely reevaluate their military strategy.

January of 1960 ushered in the third phase of Soviet military development. Khrushchev's decision to stress the development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons broke with the tradition of maintaining and emphasizing a conventional ground army. While the conventional forces did not wither away during the phase, the strategic nuclear forces were given the number one priority in weapons and force development.

The fourth phase began in about 1967 when the Soviet leadership became aware of both the potential danger of using nuclear capabilities to support foreign policy and the announcement that the U.S. was changing its strategy to include both nuclear and conventional forces - "flexible response." Since 1967, the Soviets have continued to place first priority on strategic nuclear forces but have built up a tremendous conventional capability that includes the army, navy, tactical air and air-lift forces. While maintaining a strategic nuclear balance - or even achieving some degree of nuclear superiority - the Soviets have acquired a conventional capability which can be used to support foreign policy efforts below the level of direct U.S.-USSR relationships.

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power - one of the two superpowers - in world affairs has placed an unacceptable degree of risk in pursuing a foreign policy which could develop into a nuclear confrontation with the U.S. In a future war involving a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and USSR, both sides would suffer tremendous losses. Therefore, the Soviet leaders have come to realize that the political utility of nuclear weapons has declined over the past several years. The risks of a nuclear conflict have forced the Soviets to use other means to demonstrate their resolve in carrying out their foreign policy. They have demonstrated the importance of conventional military force as "useable" force capable of supporting foreign policy goals and objectives.

Conventional military force, enhanced by a strong nuclear force, can be deployed in several ways. As demonstrated in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets employed conventional forces to ensure Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and to maintain the structure of the Warsaw Pact. As demonstrated in Angola in 1974 and 1975, the Soviets deployed their conventional military capabilities on behalf of their "clients" - the MPLA. While Soviet troops did not participate in the fighting themselves, the Soviets provided the arms and the transportation of the weaponry to the area of conflict. In all three of these examples, the Soviet Union demonstrated its resolve to support a socialist world. Additionally, in each of the interventions the Soviets were able to achieve their foreign policy goals with little or no risk.

In Hungary, the Soviet leadership was faced with an actual revolution of the Hungarian people. The Warsaw Pact was still young enough that the Soviets could really not rely on "support" from other member nations. The decision to intervene was made easier by several factors: the Americans were in the final weeks of a Presidential campaign; the U.S. Secretary of State had announced publicly that the U.S. would not intervene in Eastern Europe, and, to take the world interest away from Hungary, France and Great Britain landed troops in the Suez Canal area. Although the first Soviet use of their armed forces in Hungary was not sufficient to completely put down the Hungarian insurgents, the Soviet leadership made sure the second intervention was on a large enough scale to snuff out all resistance. World reaction was verbal only and the Soviets went about their business as they saw fit.

In Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet leadership deployed not only Soviet troops but troops from four other Warsaw Pact countries. The first "intervention" did not involve armed conflict but demonstrated the Soviets' awareness that conventional forces can be employed as a show of force in an effort to coerce another nation to follow the desires of the USSR. Initially deployed throughout Czechoslovakia on maneuvers, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces remained in and near that nation for weeks following the conclusion of the maneuvers. Dubcek, however, did not take Moscow's "hint" and continued to pursue a policy of liberalization. Before the Czechoslovak population could go to the polls and publicly indicate their support

of Dubcek's policies, the Soviets had to intervene. The intervention happened swiftly and with a force so large that it would have been useless for Czechoslovakia to resist. It is interesting to note that the Soviet leadership deployed conventional forces before the Soviets had even found a "government" in Czechoslovakia to support Soviet policy. The risks involved in the 1968 intervention were minimal. First, the Soviets deployed a force of tremendous size involving troops from four other Warsaw Pact nations. The joint effort gave the appearance of "fraternal socialist nations: working together to solve a problem which did not involve the West. The U.S., as in 1956, was in the latter months of a presidential campaign and the Soviets had no reason to believe U.S. attitudes toward Eastern Europe had changed much since 1956. In addition, the U.S. was deeply involved in Vietnam. There were several indications that the U.S. and Western Europe did not want to get involved nor did they want to give the Soviets the impression that Western military units were responding to events in Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet participation in Angola in 1974 and 1975 differed from the Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises in several ways. First, the Soviets were supporting a military action far away from their Eastern European "backyard." They demonstrated a global capability in providing arms to a client on another continent. More importantly, they showed the determination to supply armies sufficiently to achieve their goals. In addition, the Soviets carried out a war by proxy - letting Cuban

military units do the fighting - in support of the MPLA in Angola. The world could not accuse the Soviets of having troops in combat. The Soviets demonstrated to the emerging nations of the world that they can rely on the Soviet Union for support. The risks involved were minimal. The Soviets, operating outside the USSR-Eastern European area, did not confront the U.S. in an area of "declared" U.S. interest. As mentioned above, the Soviets did not employ Soviet troops in Angola, therefore avoiding world criticism on that point. The Soviet leadership always had the ability to "pull back" if the need arose - if Soviet warships encountered another naval force, the Soviet ships could have withdrawn from the area; if world pressure became too great, or there was the possibility the U.S. might intervene, the Soviets could halt their airlift and sealift of supplies to Angola. However, the U.S. was still recovering from the long campaign in Vietnam and the U.S. public was not about to let Congress involve their country in another far-off conflict.

In summary, the conventional military force has always been an important tool for Soviet leadership. While military strategy changed with the advent of nuclear warfare, conventional military force remained the principal instrument for pursuing foreign policy goals where military force is to be used at all. Through the development of a large, versatile force capable of carrying out military operations below the nuclear level, the Soviets have added "teeth" to their foreign policy. While a nuclear stalemate between the U.S. and USSR reduces, if not

eliminates, the possibility of a nuclear war, conventional forces provide the Soviets the ability to project their power, particularly in those matters not directly involving a confrontation with the U.S. However, the size and scope of the Soviet improvements in their conventional forces - particularly those facing NATO - has caused alarm throughout the West. It appears the Soviet goal is to achieve both nuclear and conventional military superiority so their foreign policy objectives will be supported at all levels of the military spectrum.

General Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has said that the Soviet increases in conventional forces "reflect...a determined, sustained effort over the past decade...."

Today that determined effort has procured for the USSR a military posture quantitatively superior to that of the West in many key areas, and consequently increasing in technological sophistication....Most important, the emergence of these capabilities has been accompanied by the development of a modern expanded production base capable of fielding military hardware in greater quantities and of greater sophistication than we have ever previously observed.¹⁹⁶

Thus, conventional force remains an important element of Soviet foreign policy. The massive buildup in recent years may be an indication of future Soviet aggressiveness in world affairs. General George S. Brown summed up the situation when he spoke before Congress early in 1978. "What the Soviets are doing is unsettling, principally because none of us knows why."¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Conventional Force Buildup," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 August 1977, p. 47.

¹⁹⁷Eugene Kozicharow, "US Warned on Balance of Power Shift," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 February 1978, p. 17.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS

conventional weapons - non-nuclear weapons.¹⁹⁸

mobility - The quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.¹⁹⁹

strategic mobility - The capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy.²⁰⁰

Soviet military doctrine - "...a system of guiding views and directives of a state on the characters of wars in given specific historical conditions, the determination of the military tasks of the state, the armed forces and the principles of their structuring; and also the methods and forms of solving all these tasks, including the armed struggle, which flow from the goals of war and the socio-economic and military possibilities of the country."²⁰¹

Soviet military strategy - "...is a system of scientific knowledge dealing with the laws of war as an armed conflict in the name of definite class interests. Strategy - on the basis of military experience, military and political conditions, economic and moral potential of the country, new means of combat, and the views and potential of the probable enemy - studies the conditions and the nature of future war, the methods for its preparation and conduct, the services of the armed forces and foundation for their strategic utilization, as well as foundations for the material and technical support and leadership of the war and the armed forces."²⁰²

¹⁹⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 September 1974), p. 87.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., p. 250.

²⁰⁰Ibid., p. 314.

²⁰¹S. N. Kozlov, The Officer's Handbook (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), p. 68, quoted in Harriet Fast Scott, "Editor's Introduction" to Soviet Military Strategy, Third ed., by V. D. Sokolovskiy (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1968), p. xviii.

²⁰²Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, p. 11.

Note: In the words of Mrs. Harriet F. Scott:

"Soviet military doctrine is the political course of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in the military sphere....Military doctrine stems from party decisions, and military strategy must be consistent with approved doctrine." ²⁰³

²⁰³Harriet Scott, "Editor's Introduction" to Soviet Military Strategy, p. xviii.

APPENDIX B

GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF PHASES IN POSTWAR SOVIET HISTORY

A. Post-World War II Soviet Leadership:

<u>1945-1953</u>	<u>1953-1955</u>	<u>1955-1964</u>	<u>1964-Present</u>
Stalin	Struggle for Political Succession	Khrushchev	Brezhnev and Kosygin

B. Post-war Phases as Developed by Professor Roman Kolkowicz²⁰⁴

I	II	III	IV
<u>1949-1954</u>	<u>1955-1960</u>	<u>1960-1964</u>	<u>1964-1969</u>
U.S.: -Rearmament -Containment of Russia -Engagement in Europe and Asia -Global posture	U.S.: -Massive retaliation doctrine -Reliance on strategic force -Military posture	U.S.: -Evolution of deterrence theory and flexible response capabilities -Search for strategic parity and superiority	U.S.: -Deterrence capability -Flexible response and global posture -Strategic parity
USSR: -Consolidation of gains -Defensive, continental posture	USSR: -Ambiguous doctrine -Reliance on conventional forces -Ambiguous posture	USSR: -Massive retaliation doctrine -Non-flexible posture -Strategic inferiority	USSR: -Deterrence capability -Flexible response and global posture -Strategic parity

²⁰⁴Kolokowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives," pp. 438-439.

	PHASE I (1945-1947)	PHASE II (1948-1952)	PHASE III (1953-1957)	PHASE IV (1958-1963)	PHASE V (1963-1968)	PHASE VI (1969-)
	<u>Preliminary skirmishing</u>	<u>U.S.S.R. assertive</u>	<u>U.S. assertive</u>	<u>U.S.S.R. assertive</u>	<u>U.S. assertive</u>	<u>U.S.S.R. assertive</u>
International standing:	U.S. advantage	U.S. advantage	U.S. advantage	Declining U.S. advantage	Marginal U.S. advantage	Roughly equal
Military power:	Probably a Soviet advantage	Marginal Soviet advantage	U.S. advantage	Uncertain U.S. advantage	Clear U.S. advantage	Marginal U.S. advantage

²⁰⁵Brzezinski, "How the Cold War was Played," pp. 110-111.

D. Phases of Soviet Post-World War II Military Development
as Presented by General M. I. Cherednichenko²⁰⁶

Post-war Period (1945-1953)		Nuclear Period	
		First Stage (1954-1959)	Second Stage (1960-)
-Abrupt changes in the international situation		-Introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles	-Mass introduction of strategic nuclear missiles
		-New principles of military art developed, but of an incomplete nature.	-Reevaluation of the role and importance of Services and branches of the Armed Forces.
-Concepts of military art based on collective experience from WWII.		-New concepts of strategy, operational art and tactics adopted.	-Strategic Rocket Forces organized and became primary service of the Armed Forces.
			-Further adjustments in the field of Soviet military thought.

²⁰⁶M. I. Cherednichenko, "On Features in the Development of Military Art in the Postwar Period," pp. 109-123.

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
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
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